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CAN TAXES MITIGATE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES?
NOAM NOKED*
ABSTRACT
Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument
to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain tax
rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures and
large golden parachutes, and to encourage performance-based compensation. Other proposals, such as imposing higher taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted increasing attention.
Contrary to this view, this Article contends that the ability
to effectively mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies through
the use of corrective taxes is very limited, and that these taxes may
cause more harm than benefit. There are a few reasons for the limited
effectiveness of corrective taxes. Importantly, the same conditions
that give rise to corporate governance problems also undermine the
effectiveness of corrective taxes. Poorly governed firms are more likely
to incur a higher tax without changing their practices that benefit
their managers. Where the same corporate governance practices
are harmful in some situations and beneficial in others, imposing
tax is unlikely to be optimal. Corrective taxes are unlikely to be
superior to other forms of regulation where the legislature knows
what governance terms are optimal, or where the legislature cannot assess the negative externalities.
This Article also examines the effects of general tax rules on
corporate governance. The impact of general tax rules and corrective taxes on corporate governance should be carefully considered
when designing a tax reform.
* Assistant Professor, Faculty of Law, The Chinese University of Hong
Kong. I am grateful to Louis Kaplow, Kobi Kastiel, Stephen Shay, John Vella,
Alvin Warren, and the participants of the 2017 symposium of the Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation for helpful comments on previous drafts
of this Article. Support was generously provided by the John M. Olin Center
for Law, Economics, and Business at Harvard Law School.

221

222 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221
TABLE OF CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION ............................................................................ 224
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES ............................. 230
A. Overview of the Relevant Agency Problems....................... 230
B. The Efficiency Consequences of Managerial
Agency Costs ........................................................................ 233
II. USING CORRECTIVE TAXES TO MITIGATE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES ................................................. 234
A. Encouraging Performance-Based Compensation ............. 235
1. The Rationale for Encouraging Performance-Based
Compensation .................................................................. 235
2. Section 162(m)................................................................. 236
3. Using Taxation to Encourage Performance-Based
Compensation .................................................................. 239
B. Preventing Harmful Changes in Control .......................... 242
1. Golden Parachutes .......................................................... 242
2. The Golden Parachute Tax Rule .................................... 244
3. Using Taxation to Prevent Harmful Sales ..................... 245
C. Breaking Pyramidal Business Structures......................... 248
1. The Rationales for Breaking Pyramidal Business
Structures......................................................................... 248
2. Intercorporate Dividend Taxation .................................. 252
3. Using Taxation to Break Pyramidal Business
Structures......................................................................... 253
D. Reducing Excessive Executive Compensation ................... 255
1. Executive Compensation ................................................. 255
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Excessive Executive
Compensation .................................................................. 257
E. Reducing Tunneling Through Related-Party
Transactions ........................................................................ 259
1. Related-Party Transactions ............................................ 259
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Tunneling Through
Related-Party Transactions............................................. 261
F. Reducing Agency Costs from Entrenchment ..................... 262
1. Entrenchment .................................................................. 262
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Agency Costs from
Entrenchment .................................................................. 263
G. Considerations for Using Corrective Taxation ................. 264

2017]

CAN TAXES MITIGATE?

223

III. HOW DO GENERAL TAX RULES AFFECT CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE? ......................................................................... 267
A. Corporate Income Taxation and Enforcement Efforts ...... 267
B. Dividend Taxation ............................................................. 270
C. Individual Income Taxation .............................................. 272
D. Complexity of the Tax Rules .............................................. 275
E. Location of Incorporation .................................................. 276
F. Financing ........................................................................... 276
G. Losses and Changes in Control ......................................... 277
IV. HOW DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT TAXATION? ... 277
A. Impact of Incentive Compensation on Tax Avoidance ...... 278
B. Impact of Ownership Structure on Tax Avoidance........... 280
CONCLUDING REMARKS ............................................................... 281

224 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221
INTRODUCTION
Policymakers have long viewed tax policy as an instrument
to influence and change corporate governance practices. Certain
tax rules were enacted to discourage pyramidal business structures1
and large golden parachutes,2 and to encourage performancebased compensation.3 Other proposals, such as imposing higher
taxes on excessive executive compensation, have also attracted
increasing attention.4
Contrary to that view, this Article contends that the ability
to effectively mitigate corporate governance problems and increase
efficiency through the use of corrective taxes is very limited. The
existing corrective taxes should be reconsidered, and in certain cases
revoked and replaced with other more efficient forms of regulation.
The relevant tax rules can be divided into two groups. The
first group consists of corrective taxes that aim to encourage or
discourage a specific behavior or practice, such as the rules concerning the taxation of intercompany dividends, golden parachutes,
and nonperformance-based compensation, discussed below. The
second group consists of general taxes that were imposed to raise
tax revenues, such as corporate, dividend, and individual taxes,
which do not directly aim to influence corporate practices. The
impact of both groups of taxes on corporate governance should be
carefully considered when designing a corporate tax reform.
The Roosevelt administration in the 1930s enacted taxation
on intercorporate dividends in order to break pyramidal business
groups.5 Some other tax rules aim to limit certain kinds of executive compensation. For example, section 162(m) tries to discourage
high levels of compensation, which are not linked to performance,
by disallowing the deduction of nonperformance-based compensation expenses exceeding $1 million, granted to a top executive of
See Randall Morck, How to Eliminate Pyramidal Business Groups: The
Double Taxation of Intercorporate Dividends and Other Incisive Uses of Tax
Policy, 19 TAX POL'Y ECON. 135 (2005).
2 See I.R.C. §§ 280G, 4999. Unless specified otherwise, all references to sections are to the Internal Revenue Code (I.R.C.) of 1986, as amended.
3 Id. § 162(m).
4 See David I. Walker, A Tax Response to the Executive Pay Problem, 93
B.U.L. REV. 326, 346 (2013).
5 See Morck, supra note 1, at 148–58.
1
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a publicly held firm.6 Tax penalties apply to large executive compensation packages granted in connection with a change in control (“golden parachutes”): the compensation paid to executives is
subject to an additional tax of 20 percent and is not deductible to
the firm.7
In addition to these tax rules, there are proposals for using
corrective taxes to mitigate corporate agency costs. One suggestion is to impose a surtax on executive compensation above a certain threshold in public firms, combined with a tax relief to the
investors equal to the surtax paid by the executives.8 This Article
discusses that proposal and two other proposals for corrective
taxes on related-party transactions and on anti-takeover devices.
Several factors limit the effectiveness of corrective taxation
in mitigating corporate governance inefficiencies. First, the same
conditions that gave rise to the agency problem also undermine
the effectiveness of corrective taxes. Firms with better governance
are more likely to alter their practices in response to a corrective
tax, whereas firms with worse governance are more likely to incur
the tax penalty without changing their practices.9 Managers in
poorly governed firms are more likely to shift the tax burden onto
the firm without changing the practices that benefit the managers.
The experience with many firms deciding to adopt nonperformance-based compensation and golden parachutes that trigger
tax penalties indicate that taxation might not be an effective
means of changing practices in poorly governed firms.10 Therefore,
unlike negative externalities that can be internalized through corrective taxation, corporate agency problems might not be effectively countered through the use of taxation, because the same
§ 162(m).
Id. §§ 280G, 4999(a).
8 See Walker, supra note 4, at 346.
9 David M. Schizer, Tax and Corporate Governance: The Influence of Tax on
Managerial Agency Costs, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE LAW AND
GOVERNANCE 1, 13 (Jeffrey Gordon & Wolf-Georg Ringe eds., 2015) questions the
effectiveness of penalizing firms for practices that benefit managers (“ … if
managers really put their own interests ahead of the firm, as this regime assumes,
why would a tax penalty on the firm deter them?”). This Article contends that
this problem is greater in firms with worse governance where the managers
are more likely to succeed in putting their own interests ahead of the firm.
10 See infra Part II.
6
7
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conditions that gave rise to the agency problem might undermine
the effectiveness of corrective taxes.
Second, where the tax is imposed on the managers, shifting
the tax burden onto the firms, in whole or in part, would reduce
their benefit and the overall efficiency gain from imposing a corrective tax.11 From the shareholders’ standpoint, a tax would be
beneficial if it reduces the firm’s agency costs to an extent exceeding the tax burden shifted onto the firm. Shareholders might also
benefit when the increase in tax revenue results in a decrease in
other taxes. From a broader efficiency perspective, corporate agency
costs reduce investment in the corporate sector and distort the
allocation of capital.12 If some of the corrective tax were borne by
the firm, it would reduce the social benefit from that corrective tax.
Third, the same corporate governance practices might be
harmful in some situations and beneficial in others. If these practices were uniformly harmful, a prohibition would be desirable, but
it might be suboptimal to ban practices where the effect is mixed.13
Imposing a tax that discourages the harmful uses of a particular
practice would discourage beneficial uses as well.14 Golden parachutes encourage managers to find beneficial sales, and help in
overcoming managerial entrenchment, although they might lead
to harmful changes in control.15 Some related-party transactions
might be used for tunneling, as discussed below, whereas others
See Walker, supra note 4, at 368–69.
See id. at 336.
13 For a general discussion on the differences between regulatory prohibitions, liability rules and corrective taxes, see Daniel B. Kelly, Strategic Spillovers,
111 COLUM. L. REV. 1641, 1700 (2011); Schizer, supra note 9, at 2 (“Tax also is a
poor fit because it typically applies mandatorily and uniformly, while responses to
agency cost should be molded to the context. For example, promoting stock options or leverage will be valuable in some settings, but disastrous in others.”).
14 See Victor Fleischer, Curb Your Enthusiasm for Pigovian Taxes, 68 VAND.
L. REV. 1673 (2015). Fleischer argues that corrective taxation is unlikely to be
efficient where the negative externality from a certain activity varies significantly across the different agents that engage in that activity. In analogy, see
Giorgia Maffini & John Vella, Evidence-based Policy Making? The Commission’s Proposal for an FTT 20 (Oxford University Centre for Business Taxation,
WP 15/15, 2015) (“[M]ore generally, the [Financial Transaction Tax] does not
discriminate between ‘good’ and ‘bad’ transactions, and so whilst it might act
as a disincentive for transactions that do not enhance market efficiency it will
also act as a disincentive for transactions that do.”).
15 See infra Section II.B.
11
12
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might increase the firm’s value.16 Anti-takeover arrangements
might be used by an underperforming management to entrench
itself, whereas the same measures may assist an excellent management against harmful bids that could destroy the firm’s longterm value.17 Strengthening other mechanisms that can distinguish
between harmful and beneficial applications, and allowing only
the latter ones, might be superior to taxation.
Fourth, the tax system is limited in its ability to assess real
risk and performance goals. The tax penalty under section 162(m)
could be easily avoided, and the deferral under section 83 could
be easily received, by granting compensation conditioned on easily attainable performance targets.18 The tax authorities’ limited
ability to assess these factors raises doubts about the effectiveness
of using tax rules to incentivize pay-for-performance compensation schemes that actually reward good managerial performance.
Strengthening corporate governance mechanisms, such as board
and shareholders’ approval processes for executive compensation
packages, may be superior to using the tax system for incentivizing adopting performance-based compensation schemes.
Fifth, taxation might not have many advantages over other
forms of regulation in mitigating corporate governance inefficiencies. If the government knows what the best governance terms
are, command and control regulation is preferable.19 Taxation
would be preferable where the government does not know which
governance terms are optimal, but can assess the externalities
generated by the relevant behaviors and practices, and can impose a tax equal to these externalities.20 With respect to pyramidal business groups, the case for limiting this practice through a
ban is more compelling. The harm caused by these structures is
well documented, whereas it is hard to impose a corrective tax
equal to the externality induced by each layer of the pyramid.21
Nonetheless, in respect of some other corporate governance practices, there is a significant difficulty on both ends: it is hard to
See infra Section II.E.
See infra Section II.F.
18 See infra Section II.A.
19 See Richard M. Hynes, Taxing Control, 38 J. CORP. L. 567, 581–83 (2013).
20 See id.
21 See infra Section II.C.
16
17
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determine what the optimal corporate governance practice is, and
it is also hard to design a tax equal to the negative externality
from each practice. Unlike a ban on a particular practice, a tax
allows an action to take place if the benefit exceeds the cost of the
tax.22 A tax would allow an action to take place where the benefit
from a particular action exceeds the tax, whereas a ban would
prevent any action regardless of the size of the benefit.23 However,
if insiders, and not the firm, receive the benefit while the firm is
harmed from that action, the firm would be better off under a regulation forbidding that action. In addition, it may be more politically feasible to adopt a tax rather than a ban. An alternative to
taxation and command and control regulation is to strengthen
mechanisms, both internal and external, that can distinguish between harmful and beneficial applications of the relevant corporate
governance practices, and allow only the latter ones.
General tax rules, discussed in the third part of this Article,
are not corrective taxes in their essence because they do not aim
to encourage or discourage a particular activity or behavior. Nonetheless, they have a significant influence on corporate governance.
These effects should be taken into account when designing corporate and dividend tax rules. Lowering tax rates while increasing
enforcement efforts might improve corporate governance.24 In addition, it may be more efficient to use a corporate income tax rather
than a dividend tax as a source of revenue because the former
creates fewer distortions.25 Although dividend taxes reduce the
dividend payment level and worsen corporate governance, a certain level of tax on dividend distribution to individuals is needed
to provide them with an incentive to invest through tax-exempt
institutional investors, such as pension funds, which can mitigate
the collective action problem and improve monitoring.26
22 For a general discussion on the differences between taxes and regulatory
prohibitions, see Kelly, supra note 13, at 1700.
23 See id.
24 See Mihir A. Desai, Alexander Dyck & Luigi Zingales, Theft and Taxes,
84 J. FIN. ECON. 591 (2007).
25 See Raj Chetty & Emmanuel Saez, Dividend and Corporate Taxation in
an Agency Model of the Firm, 2 AM. ECON. J. ECON. POL’Y 1, 14 (2010).
26 See Randall Morck & Bernard Yeung, Dividend Taxation and Corporate
Governance, 19 J. ECON. PERSP. 163, 164 (2005).
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Certain individual income tax rules also have a significant
influence on the quality of corporate governance.27 The Tax Code
creates an incentive to receive deferred compensation in stock options and restricted stocks that are conditioned on meeting some
performance requirements, as the tax on these forms of compensation is easily deferred.28 The resulting effect on corporate governance is unclear. Although this form of compensation better
aligns the managers’ incentives with those of the shareholders, it
fails to incentivize the adoption of performance-based compensation; this is because easily achievable performance goals satisfy
the requirements for deferral under this tax rule.29 Moreover,
higher equity-based compensation does not necessarily substitute
for other forms of compensation.30 In addition, the tax rule regarding working condition fringe benefits encourages granting more
costly perks.31 This might be problematic from a corporate governance standpoint because these perks are not subject to the same
reporting and approval procedures as executive compensation.32
The complexity of the Tax Code could be used to disguise
earnings manipulations and tunneling. Thus, simplifying and
harmonizing tax rules can eliminate tunneling opportunities and
improve monitoring and transparency.33 Other tax rules that
might influence the quality of the corporate governance include
the rules that affect the decision where to incorporate and the
rules that influence financing choices between debt and equity.34
Although this Article focuses on the effect of taxation on corporate governance, it is important to note that corporate governance
practices and characteristics influence taxation.35 The effect of corporate governance on taxation is also a relevant factor to be considered when evaluating the tax system and possible reforms.36
See infra Section III.C.
See id.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 27–28; Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala,
Tax and Corporate Governance: An Economic Approach, in TAX AND CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE 13, 27 (Josef Drexl et al. eds., 2008).
34 See infra Part III.
35 See infra Part IV.
36 See id.
27
28
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There is evidence which shows that a higher level of incentive
compensation is associated with an increased level of tax avoidance, especially among firms with better corporate governance. 37
The ownership structure also affects the level of tax avoidance, as
family-owned firms and firms with dual class stock structure have
a lower level of tax avoidance, whereas firms in which private equity (PE) and hedge funds have large holdings show higher levels
of tax avoidance.38 In addition, firms might also overpay taxes
when trying to disguise fraud in reporting inflated earnings.39 These
findings might indicate that eliminating tax-avoidance opportunities would have a stronger effect on firms with higher levels of
incentive compensation and on firms held by PE and hedge funds.
A tax reform that would reduce tax avoidance opportunities, reduce
corporate and dividend taxes, and increase enforcement efforts,
could possibly improve corporate governance for firms with weak
governance, and provide well-governed firms with stronger incentives to focus more on real improvement in performance rather
than on enhancing tax efficiency.
The structure of the remaining parts of this Article is as
follows. The first part reviews the main relevant corporate agency
problems that corrective taxes aim to address, namely, entrenchment and tunneling, and it also discusses the efficiency consequences of corporate agency costs. The second part explores the
use of corrective taxation to reduce corporate agency costs. The
third part explores the effects of general tax rules on corporate
governance, and how these rules can be used to reduce corporate
agency costs. The fourth part identifies the effects of corporate
governance practices and characteristics that may affect taxation.
I. CORPORATE GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES
A. Overview of the Relevant Agency Problems
The agency problem is central to the intersection of taxation
and corporate governance.40 Where a wholly owned corporation that
is managed by a sole shareholder avoids tax, it does not have any
See id.
See id.
39 See id.
40 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 14.
37
38
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consequences on its corporate governance. This tax avoidance
merely diverts resources from the state to the shareholder. 41 A
meaningful intersection of taxation and corporate governance appears where an agency problem exists.42 The research on this intersection identifies whether the tax system mitigates or aggravates
corporate governance agency problems.43
The main relevant categories of corporate governance agency
problems are managerial entrenchment and tunneling. Managerial entrenchment occurs where managers make it impractical or
very costly for shareholders to replace them.44 In general, not taxing the nonpecuniary benefits of control would increase the entrepreneurs’ incentives to retain control beyond the socially optimal
level.45 Managers can use anti-takeover devices, such as poison
pills, to insulate themselves from the risk of being replaced. 46
Managers therefore have an incentive to entrench themselves to
prevent a takeover that might result in their replacement, even if
this takeover is beneficial for the shareholders. If managers can
counter the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control
and entrench themselves, it would cause suboptimal managerial
incentives because the managers are not exposed to the risk of
being replaced for underperformance.47 In cases where managers
hold a large stake of the firm’s cash flow rights, they will still have
incentives to maximize the value of the firm even if they are entrenched.48 The incentive problem would be greater where managers hold fewer equity rights because their interests are not
aligned with the shareholders’ interest and do not provide adequate
incentives to maximize the firm’s value.49
See id.
See id.
43 See id.
44 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, Management Entrenchment: The
Case of Manager-Specific Investments, 25 J. FIN. ECON. 123, 126 (1989).
45 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 581.
46 For a general discussion on the reasons why firms adopt antitakeover
arrangements, see Lucian Bebchuk, Why Firms Adopt Antitakeover Arrangements,
152 U. PENN. L. REV. 713 (2003).
47 See Bebchuk, infra note 174, at 7.
48 See id. at 11.
49 See id.
41
42
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Tunneling occurs where resources are transferred out of a
firm to its managers or controllers.50 Atanasov et al. use a taxonomy
that divides tunneling into three basic types: cash flow tunneling,
asset tunneling and equity tunneling.51 Cash flow tunneling is defined as a transfer of a portion of the current year’s cash flow,
without affecting the firm’s long-term assets.52 One important
form of cash flow tunneling involves price manipulation: the firm
might buy inputs from insiders at a price higher than market
value, or sell outputs to them at a price below market value.53
Another significant form of cash flow tunneling involves excessive
executive compensation and excessive spending on perks.54
Asset tunneling involves the transfer of significant, productive, long-term assets from the firm, or to the firm, for a price different from the fair market value.55 It usually involves self-dealing
transactions in which an insider sells overpriced assets to the
firm, or buys assets from the firm for a price below the fair value.56
One common form of asset tunneling is to make an investment in
an affiliated company in terms that outside investors would not
accept.57 Intangible assets can be used for this kind of tunneling,
as it is difficult for minority shareholders to prove that the price
is unfair.58 Asset tunneling includes many tunneling practices,
such as investing in a troubled affiliate, repurchasing of shares
from insiders for a price above the market value, and providing
intellectual property rights to related parties at a discount or buying rights from them at a premium.59
Equity tunneling involves an increase in the insider’s share
of the firm at the expense of the outside shareholders, without
changing the firm’s assets or cash flow.60 This kind of tunneling
See Vladimir Atanasov, Bernard Black & Conrad S. Ciccotello, Law and
Tunneling, 37(1) J. CORP. L. 1, 5 (2011).
51 See id.
52 See id.
53 See id. at 6ï7.
54 See id. at 7.
55 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 5.
56 See id.
57 See id. at 7ï8.
58 See id. at 8.
59 See id. at 7–8. The distinction between cash flow and asset tunneling
might not be convincing because cash is not different from other assets.
60 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 8ï9.
50
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includes various forms, such as dilutive equity offerings in which
shares or stock options are offered to insiders for below the market
value, freezeouts for less than the stock’s fair market value, sale
of control without offering to buy minority shares, repurchases of
insiders’ shares for more than the fair value, and excessive equitybased executive compensation.61 Some transactions involve more
than one type of tunneling.62
B. The Efficiency Consequences of Managerial Agency Costs
Although it is commonly assumed that managerial agency
costs are borne by shareholders, this assumption is questionable,
especially in the long run.63 An analogy can be drawn between the
incidence of corporate income taxation and managerial agency
costs, as both can be thought of as taxes on the return from an
investment in corporate equity.64 If the incidences of corporate income tax and systematic agency costs are similar, then a large
share of the burden of the corporate agency costs is likely to be
borne in the long run by immobile factors, such as noncorporate
capital and labor.65 The Joint Committee on Taxation estimated
that in the long run 75 percent of corporate income taxes are borne
by capital owners, and 25 percent are borne by domestic labor.66
In many cases, shareholders can observe agency costs, either directly or indirectly through a lower rate of return.67 When
shareholders and potential investors can predict the agency costs
and the lower return, they would reduce their investment and
shift their capital to other investment channels.68 If capital is
shifted out of the public company sector onto other sectors because
See id. at 9.
See id. at 7.
63 See David I. Walker, Who Bears the Cost of Excessive Executive Compensation (and Other Corporate Agency Costs)?, 57 VILL. L. REV. 653, 654 (2012).
64 See id.
65 See id. at 666.
66 See Joint Committee on Taxation, Modeling the Distribution of Taxes on
Business Income 4 (2013), https://www.jct.gov/publications.html?func=startdown
&id=4528 [https://perma.cc/3T4R-G2MU].
67 See Walker, supra note 63, at 664–66.
68 See id. at 661–62.
61
62
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of agency costs, it would distort the efficient capital allocation in
the market and reduce social welfare.69
The argument for regulation would be more compelling if
corporate governance inefficiencies have significant implications on
overall social welfare and various third parties.70 From a distributive perspective, a transfer of wealth from shareholders to executives might not be perceived as too problematic, whereas imposing
costs on labor is likely to prompt more governmental intervention.71
II. USING CORRECTIVE TAXES TO MITIGATE CORPORATE
GOVERNANCE INEFFICIENCIES
The discussion below analyzes the current use of corrective
taxation in the contexts of performance-based compensation, golden
parachutes, and pyramidal business groups. It also examines potential uses of taxation in the contexts of executive compensation,
related party transactions, and anti-takeover devices.72
In general, corrective taxes and subsidies aim to encourage
or discourage a specific behavior or practice.73 According to the
economic theory, an optimal corrective tax or subsidy should
See id. at 669.
See id. at 671–72.
71 See id. at 670–71.
72 There is a question in the corporate governance literature whether private ordering can mitigate corporate governance inefficiencies: whether shareholders can resolve these problems on their own, without any regulation or
governmental intervention. The supporters of regulation contend that shareholders alone cannot successfully mitigate many corporate governance inefficiencies because of various reasons: individual shareholders of widely held
companies are uninformed and suffer from a collective action problem, and are
therefore unable to effectively monitor managerial actions; institutional investors also suffer from inadequate incentives, conflict of interests, and regulatory
constraints that impede their ability to act like real owners. See, e.g., Lucian
A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Private Ordering and the Proxy Access Debate, 65
BUS. LAW. 329, 335–36 (2010); Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: the
Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 UCLA L. REV. 812, 813 (1992); Marcel
Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate
Control, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1021, 1048 (2007). In general, contractual problems
of adverse selection, moral hazard, and incompleteness limit the effectiveness
of contract-based private ordering.
73 See generally ARTHUR C. PIGOU, THE ECONOMICS OF WELFARE (1920) and
the extensive literature on corrective (Pigovian) taxes and subsidies.
69
70
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equal the marginal external social cost or benefit.74 Many countries
have adopted various corrective taxes, such as taxes on gasoline,
carbon emissions, and alcohol and tobacco products.75 Many countries have also introduced corrective subsidies, usually in the form of
tax benefits, to incentivize particular behaviors, activities and investments, such as charitable donations, retirement savings, research and development activities, and foreign direct investments.76
A. Encouraging Performance-Based Compensation
1. The Rationale for Encouraging Performance-Based
Compensation
At the beginning of the 1990s, prominent economists urged
shareholders to support large pay packages that would provide
high-powered incentives.77 According to their view, shareholders
should be more concerned about providing the managers with sufficiently strong incentives than about the size of the executive
compensation.78 In theory, performance-based compensation should
align the interests of the managers with those of the shareholders,
and provide managers with incentives to maximize the firm’s value.79
The empirical evidence indicates that cash compensation, including bonuses, is weakly correlated with firms’ industry-adjusted
performance.80 Less salient forms of non-equity compensation,
such as pension benefits, loans and other perks, are also insensitive to managerial performance.81 Equity-based compensation
can provide managers with the desirable incentives.82 However,
74 See LOUIS KAPLOW, THE THEORY OF TAXATION AND PUBLIC ECONOMICS
212–13 (2008).
75 For a discussion on different kinds of corrective taxes, see Fleischer, supra
note 14, at 1700–01 (food taxes), 1703–04 (environmental taxes), 1706–08 (tobacco and alcohol taxes), and throughout that article.
76 For a discussion on corrective subsidies, see Fleischer, supra note 14, at
1681, 1685, 1709–10.
77 See, e.g., Michael C. Jensen & Kevin J. Murphy, Performance Pay and
Top-Management Incentives, 98 J. POL. ECON. 225, 226 (1990).
78 See LUCIAN BEBCHUK & JESSE FRIED, PAY WITHOUT PERFORMANCE: THE
UNFULFILLED PROMISE OF EXECUTIVE COMPENSATION 6 (2004).
79 See id.
80 See id. at 7.
81 See id.
82 See id.
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according to Bebchuk and Fried, managers frequently use their
influence to receive large benefits from equity-based compensation even when their performance is poor.83 For example, a large
majority of firms grant stock options without filtering out the
stock price rises which occur due to industry and general market
trends, which are unrelated to the managers’ performance that
increased the firm’s value.84 Bebchuk and Fried suggest adopting
policies that provide managers with compensation that is truly
based on their performance.85 In their view, institutional investors should pressure firms to use equity-based forms that filter out
windfalls, tie compensation to the management’s performance, and
limit the executives’ ability to unload their equity incentives.86
2. Section 162(m)
Under section 162(m), a publicly held corporation cannot deduct compensation with respect to its CEO or its three next most
highly compensated officers other than its CFO to the extent that the
amount of the annual compensation paid to that executive exceeds
$1 million.87 However, compensation that qualifies as “performancebased compensation” can be deducted with no limitation.88
The performance-based compensation should be granted in
accordance with the following requirements: the compensation
must be paid only if the pre-established, objective performance
goals have been achieved; a committee with two or more outside
directors should establish the performance goals, in writing, at a
time when the outcome is substantially uncertain, no later than
ninety days after the beginning of the performance period, and
not after 25 percent of the performance period has passed; whether
the performance goals have been met should be determined by
using objectively determinable criteria; the committee has discretion to reduce compensation, but cannot increase it on a discretionary basis; the material terms of the award must be disclosed
to shareholders, who vote whether to approve them; and before
See id.
See id.
85 See id. at 10–11.
86 See id. at 184.
87 § 162(m)(1).
88 Id. § 162(m)(4)(C); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e).
83
84
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granting the compensation, the committee must certify in writing
that the performance goals have been satisfied.89
A special rule applies to stock options. In general, compensation awarded as stock options or as stock appreciation rights is
deemed to qualify as performance-based compensation if the compensation plan is made by the abovementioned committee, the
compensation plan states the maximum number of shares of options or rights that can be granted during a specified period to
any executive, and the exercise price of the option is not less than
the fair market value of a share on the date the option is granted.90
Restricted stocks and other equity compensation forms that do
not qualify for this special rule will not qualify as performancebased compensation unless the general requirements under section 162(m), listed above, are met.91
When section 162(m) was enacted in 1992, a compensation
of $1 million per year was at the high end of executives’ salary
range.92 Enacting this tax rule affected compensation schemes, as
more firms shifted executive pay into performance-based compensation plans.93 It also served as a benchmark for executives who
earned below $1 million: they pressured their boards to increase
their nonperformance-based compensation to $1 million.94 Consequently, many firms increased their executive compensation levels.95
It is important to note that compensation levels have increased
significantly since the early 1990s.96 Firms today routinely exceed
the $1 million nonperformance-based compensation threshold.97
89 See id. The “material terms” that must be approved by shareholders include the executives eligible to receive compensation, a description of the criteria
on which the performance goals are based, and either the maximal compensation
or the formula used to calculate the compensation to be paid if the performance
goals are met. Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(4)(i).
90 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-27(e)(2)(vi)(A).
91 See id.
92 See Walker, supra note 4, at 361.
93 See id. at 361–62.
94 See id.
95 See David G. Harris & Jane R. Livingstone, Federal Tax Legislation as
an Implicit Contracting Cost Benchmark: The Definition of Excessive Executive
Compensation, 77 ACCT. REV. 997, 998 (2002).
96 See Steven N. Kaplan, CEO Pay and Corporate Governance in the U.S.:
Perceptions, Facts, and Challenges, 25 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 10 (2013).
97 See Walker, supra note 4, at 383. According to Michael Doran, Uncapping
Executive Pay, 90 S. CAL. L. REV. 101, 116–17 (2017), 58 percent of the S&P
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These firms state in their proxy statements that the tax consequence is only one of the considerations the board considers when
deciding on the executive compensation.98
In addition, many firms adopt performance-based compensation plans that are deductible under section 162(m).99 First, as
noted above, stock options are usually deductible if the exercise
price of the option is not less than the fair market value of a share
on the date the option is granted.100 Second, firms can adopt performance targets that are easily attainable.101 Per Bebchuk and
Fried, performance-based payments are often conditioned on easily achieved performance targets that do not reflect good performance relative to peer firms.102 Performance-based plans often
grant executives a higher compensation for events that are not
necessarily connected to good managerial performance, such as
positive developments in the market or making acquisitions.103
Thus, to circumvent this rule, firms might adopt risky pay strategies that are still not performance-based.104 Third, section 162(m)
does not apply after the executive retires, so this rule can be circumvented if nonperformance-based compensation is granted as
retirement benefits.105
Although section 162(m) requires the shareholders’ approval for the “material terms” of the performance-based compensation plan,106 shareholders have little influence on the actual
compensation schemes. The material terms on which shareholders vote do not usually specify the design of any pay package.107
Instead, the material terms usually include only general parameters and vague targets.108 In addition, as argued by Bebchuk and
500 companies paid their CEO nonperformance salaries exceeding $1 million
in 2014. Doran also finds that companies have become more willing to exceed
the $1 million cap over time. See id. at 109–12.
98 See Walker, supra note 4, at 383.
99 See id. at 361.
100 See supra note 90.
101 See Doran, supra note 97, at 121; Walker, supra note 4, at 384.
102 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 135.
103 See id.
104 See id. at 138.
105 See id. at 110–11.
106 § 162(m)(4)(c)(ii).
107 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 196.
108 See id.

2017]

CAN TAXES MITIGATE?

239

Fried, shareholders can fail to approve a compensation plan, but
such a veto might not make them better off.109 Bebchuk and Fried
also argue that the enthusiasm in the last two decades in favor of
performance-based compensation, supported by Congress in enacting section 162(m), was used by managers by adding more such
compensation without a corresponding downward adjustment in
cash compensation.110
3. Using Taxation to Encourage Performance-Based
Compensation
Taxation can be used to incentivize the adoption of certain
compensation schemes. If a tax is imposed on nonperformancebased compensation, it increases the cost of such compensation
scheme.111 If this tax burden is borne by managers, even partially,
they would have a greater incentive to prefer performance-based
compensation.112 If shareholders benefit from performance-based
executive compensation, they should support it even without a tax
penalty on nonperformance-based compensation.113 However, as
noted by Bebchuk and Fried, the shareholders’ ability to successfully object and negotiate efficient compensation packages might
be limited.114
The experience with section 162(m) indicates that managers
in some firms have a lot of power over the compensation-setting
process, and this can be used to approve pay plans that result in
triggering a tax penalty to the corporation.115 If firms with worse
corporate governance are more likely to adopt payment schemes
that trigger a tax penalty, this tax rule might aggravate the harm
to the shareholders investing in these firms and also to the overall
social deadweight loss.116
See id. at 49.
See id. at 73.
111 See id. at 122.
112 See id.
113 See id.
114 See id. at 49.
115 See Doran, supra note 97, at 116–17, for a review of S&P 500 companies
that grant compensation that triggers this tax penalty.
116 As discussed above, these costs might be borne by immobile factors such
as labor. See also id. at 120.
109
110
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Moreover, a tax rule that disallows the deduction of a certain expense would affect different firms differently, depending
on their relevant tax rates.117 If a firm is subject to a marginal
corporate income tax rate of 35 percent, the cost of disallowing
deduction would be 35 percent times the expense. However, if the
marginal tax rate is only about 3 percent, the cost of disallowing
the deduction of an expense would be much lower. Although the
statutory corporate income tax rate in the United States is 35 percent, most large firms use tax planning to lower that tax rate significantly, and it is possible that a non-deduction rule would be
less costly to some firms.118 Companies that can carry forward
losses (which may be a result of poor managerial decisions) can
avoid paying corporate income tax,119 thus resulting in low effectiveness of disallowing a deduction. Generally, firms that incur a
lower tax penalty would have a weaker incentive to adopt performance-based compensation plans. As a lower tax rate might not
be associated with better or worse managerial performance, it is
unclear if there should be a different treatment of firms based on
the tax rates they are subject to.120 One solution for this would be
See Schizer, supra note 9, at 5. This is a general problem where corrective
taxes are imposed on income, and the applicable tax rates vary across taxpayers.
118 See, e.g., Philip Van Doorn, Here are the actual tax rates the biggest companies in America pay, MARKETWATCH (Oct. 14, 2017), http://www.marketwatch
.com/story/these-companies-may-enjoy-a-windfall-under-trumps-tax-plan-2017
-09-29 [https://perma.cc/7ZGK-FKYM] (showing that the effective tax rates that
Dow Jones companies pay vary greatly); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE,
GAO-16-363, CORPORATE INCOME TAX: MOST LARGE PROFITABLE U.S. CORPORATIONS PAID TAX BUT EFFECTIVE TAX RATES DIFFERED SIGNIFICANTLY FROM
THE STATUTORY RATE i, 13, (2016), http://www.gao.gov/assets/680/675844.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D2U5-2NWA] (showing that large firms paid an average of
16.1 percent of reported income in 2012, which is well below the statutory rate
of 35 percent).
119 U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 118, at 5.
120 Schizer, supra note 9, at 5, notes that “a firm with substantial net operating losses, which would not pay taxes anyway, could be immune from the penalty.
If anything, this seems backwards. Firms may be unprofitable because of agency
costs, and these firms should not be left out.” However, as discussed in Section
IV.A below, there is evidence suggesting that firms with entrenched managers
engage in less tax-avoidance. See infra Section IV.A. A profitable, well-governed
firm can report a loss for tax purposes in the United States while shifting profits
offshore. Therefore, it is uncertain whether lower applicable tax rates are generally
associated with better or worse governance and managerial performance.
117
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to set a corrective tax irrespective of the corporate income tax liability.121 For example, the corrective tax imposed on the firm or
on the executive can be a fixed percentage of the nonperformancebased compensation.
The experience with section 162(m) also shows that a broad
and vague definition of performance-based compensation can significantly undermine the effectiveness of that rule in promoting a
real performance-based compensation. As discussed above, many
forms of performance-based compensation, deductible under this
section, could be based on easily attainable targets, activities that
do not increase shareholder value, or windfalls.122 A more sophisticated tax rule could, in theory, allow the deduction of performancebased compensation only if it filters out all nonperformance factors.
The tax rule can also impose other limitations suggested by Bebchuk
and Fried, such as limitations on executives’ ability to unload equity incentives.123 However, enforcing a sophisticated tax rule that
requires filtering out all the nonperformance factors and windfalls might be very complicated and costly, and the tax authority
might not have the expertise to administer such rule.124 Moreover,
a narrow approach to a deductible performance-based compensation
might result in more firms, especially those with worse corporate
governance, choosing to pay high nonperformance-based compensation while incurring higher tax.125 Therefore, it is possible that
even though a more targeted tax rule could allow favorable treatment only of real performance-based compensation, this rule might
not solve the problem of managers having an excessive power over
the compensation-setting process and rewarding themselves in
compensation that is not linked to performance.
In summary, section 162(m) fails to achieve its goal to encourage real performance-based compensation, while it increases
It is possible to determine that the additional taxable income, resulting
from a non-deduction rule, will be taxed at the highest corporate income tax
rate, similar to § 7874. I.R.C. § 7874(e)(2)(C).
122 See Doran, supra note 97, at 121; Walker, supra note 4, at 384.
123 See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 10. For a discussion on reform
proposals that would narrow the deduction under section 162(m), see Doran,
supra note 97, at 123–36.
124 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 4 (discussing the mismatch in institutional
focus and expertise where government tax experts administer rules that address
corporate governance problems).
125 See infra Section II.G.
121
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the costs for companies and the overall deadweight loss, especially for companies with worse corporate governance as they are
more likely to trigger the tax penalty. Thus, repealing this tax rule is
socially desirable.126 As the tax system cannot effectively assess
what a real performance-based compensation is, encouraging payfor-performance should be done through corporate governance mechanisms and not through the tax system.
B. Preventing Harmful Changes in Control
1. Golden Parachutes
Golden parachutes are any form of compensation granted
to executives in connection with a change in control.127 There are
several reasons why firms like granting golden parachutes. Even
excellent managers might oppose a value-increasing change in
control if the new controller might replace them.128 Granting
managers golden parachutes would encourage them to support a
beneficial sale of the firm, a sale that they might otherwise oppose.
Where the management is entrenched, giving underperforming
executives a golden parachute if they are to cede control would
compensate them for forgoing the private benefits of control.129
This may increase the value of the firm if a better management
replaces the entrenched one. Empirical evidence shows that firms
that offer golden parachute packages have a higher likelihood of
receiving an acquisition offer and being acquired.130 Golden parachutes are associated with a higher acquisition premium and this
association is explained at least partly by the effect of golden parachutes on executive incentives.131
However, golden parachutes might have negative consequences.132 One rationale for limiting golden parachutes may be
connected to a general motivation to reduce excessive executive
See Doran, supra note 97, at 147–50.
§ 280(G)(2)(A).
128 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 10.
129 See id.
130 See Lucian Bebchuk, Alma Cohen & Charles C.Y. Wang, Golden Parachutes and the Wealth of Shareholders, 25 J. CORP. FIN. 140 (2014).
131 See id.
132 See id.
126
127
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compensation. This topic is further discussed below.133 It is unclear if there should be a special treatment of golden parachutes
on that basis because golden parachutes are only one form of compensation. Another reason to reduce the use of golden parachutes
is to prevent inefficient and value-decreasing changes in control
that are backed by the management because it receives large private benefits in the form of golden parachutes.134 Where the managers’ employment is terminated after the control has been changed,
they might be less sensitive to reputational costs and may not be
held accountable for future poor performance.135 Even if shareholders can veto some events of change in control, managers still
have a strong influence on the approval processes and the information provided to the shareholders. If they have a strong personal
benefit from approving such changes, they might try to reduce the
shareholders’ ability to effectively monitor and prevent harmful
changes in control.
Golden parachutes affect executive incentives in general,
not only with respect to a sale of the firm.136 Firms that adopted
golden parachutes have lower risk-adjusted stock returns relative
to their industry peers that did not adopt golden parachutes, both
during the two-year period surrounding the adoption and in the
subsequent several years.137 It is not clear what causes these low
returns.138 Bebchuk et al. suggest that it can be explained, at least
partially, by the effect of golden parachutes on executive incentives and performance not facing an acquisition offer.139 They argue that the market for corporate control disciplines managers
because they know that they might lose their job if they underperform, and that this disciplinary force is weakened where the
managers are guaranteed a large benefit in the event of a change
in control.140 This explanation might not be relevant to firms with
See infra Section II.D.
See id.
135 See Walker, supra note 4, at 356 (“The constraint created by investor and
financial press outrage over perceived executive pay abuses would have much
less force on departing executives and overseers.”).
136 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 130, at 141.
137 See id.
138 See id.
139 See id.
140 See id.
133
134
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entrenched management, as the executives in these firms are already insulated from the market for corporate control. Alternatively,
it is possible that golden parachutes are associated with worse performance, but do not cause it.141 More research analyzing these
effects is needed.
In summary, rules that discourage the use of golden parachutes may improve managers’ incentives with respect to undesirable sales and increase the disciplinary force of the market for
corporate control on executive incentives.142 However, the use of
golden parachutes can increase the value for shareholders by providing executive incentives to pursue beneficial sales,143 especially
where the management is entrenched.
2. The Golden Parachute Tax Rule
In general, a large “golden parachute” payment is not deductible to the corporation,144 and the receiving executive is subject to a 20 percent excise tax on such payment.145 The following paragraphs review this tax treatment.
Section 280G disallows the deduction of excessive parachute
payments, triggered by change in control to disqualified individuals.146 The term “parachute payment” includes all compensation
forms granted to a disqualified individual in connection with a
change in control.147 A change in control includes any of the following three events: a change in ownership of the corporation’s stock;
a change in ownership of a substantial portion of the corporation’s
assets; or a change in effective control of the corporation.148 Disqualified individuals include officers of the corporation, shareholders
who own more than 1 percent of the fair market value of the corporation’s stock, and highly compensated individuals.149
Parachute payments are excessive if the amount of the parachute payments exceeds a threshold amount, which is calculated
See id.
See id.
143 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 10.
144 § 4999(a).
145 Id. § 280G.
146 See id.
147 See id.
148 See id.
149 § 280G(c).
141
142
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as three times the disqualified individual’s “base amount” (the average annual compensation of the individual over the past five
years).150 The “three times base amount” is a threshold test, so if the
parachute payments exceed three times the base amount, the total
excessive parachute payments equal the total parachute payments
less one times the base amount.151 An amount of up to three times
the base amount will not trigger this unfavorable tax treatment.152
Under section 4999, the disqualified individual should pay
a 20 percent tax on all excessive parachute payments which he or
she receives, in addition to the ordinary income tax on such income.153 The firm may gross up the payment to the disqualified
individual for the excise tax, but the gross-up payments will be
considered as excessive parachute payments, subject to the 20 percent excise tax, and will not be deductible to the corporation.154 Many
firms provide their executives with golden parachute tax grossups, even though these are very costly.155 However, these gross-ups
have become a target for criticism because of their high cost, and public firms are under pressure to eliminate these arrangements.156
3. Using Taxation to Prevent Harmful Sales
Taxing golden parachutes should reduce the use of compensation granted based on a change in control. The benefits from
reducing the use of golden parachutes are lower incentives to approve value-decreasing sales, and possibly better exposure to the
disciplinary force of the market for corporate control.157 The costs
from reducing the use of golden parachutes derive from lower incentives for executives to facilitate a beneficial sale that might
§ 280G(b).
See id.
152 See id.
153 Id. § 4999.
154 Golden Parachute Payments Guide: Audit Techniques Guide, INTERNAL
REVENUE SERVICE (Jan. 20, 2017), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-utl/goldenpara
chuteatg.pdf [https://perma.cc/MNF2-FMR5].
155 See Jennifer S. Conway & Nicole F. Foster, Golden Parachute Tax Gross-Ups:
Weathering the Storm, 3 BLOOMBERG L. REP. EMP. BEN. No. 22, 1 (Oct. 25, 2010).
156 See id. at 1–4.
157 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 130, at 141 (noting that by making acquisitions less costly or even beneficial to executives, golden parachutes weaken
the disciplinary force of the market for corporate control).
150
151
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result in their replacement.158 Shareholders in firms that reduce
their golden parachutes benefit from a lower cost of compensation
for the managers, whereas shareholders in firms that grant high
golden parachutes incur the additional cost of the tax.
It is possible that firms with worse corporate governance
are more likely to grant large golden parachute packages despite
their high cost.159 This may mitigate the problem of entrenchment, as managers would have higher incentives to sell, but
would not mitigate the threat of a value-decreasing change in control, which might be greater in firms with poor corporate governance and ineffective monitoring.160 Poorly governed firms that
do not grant their entrenched managers golden parachutes are
less likely to be sold, and underperforming managers are less
likely to be replaced.161
Executives in well-governed firms are more likely to reduce
to size of golden parachute packages in response to a high tax
penalty.162 However, executives in well-governed firms are already
less likely to agree to a value-decreasing change in control, so the
benefit from preventing harmful changes in control might be limited in respect of these firms.163 As discussed above, executives in
all firms may oppose a beneficial sale that might risk their future
employment if they are not provided with an incentive to agree to
such sale.164 Thus, the tax penalty would likely result in less
value-increasing sales.
It is unclear whether the overall benefits from imposing a
corrective tax on golden parachutes exceed the costs. The mixed
benefits and costs make the assessment of whether golden parachutes are good or bad a context-specific question, and the general
net long-term effect is ambiguous.165 Imposing a tax on golden
See id. at 151; Schizer, supra note 9, at 10.
See infra Section II.G.
160 See supra Section II.B.1.
161 See infra Section II.G.
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See supra Section II.B.1.
165 See generally Bebchuk et al., supra note 130, at 140–41 (finding that
golden parachute payments are, on average, “associated with reduced value for
shareholders” but golden parachute payments in some contexts may result in
increased value for shareholders).
158
159
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parachutes would reduce some of the inefficiencies created by
them, but also some of the beneficial incentives they create. In
addition, executives of some firms shift the tax burden onto their
firms,166 and this additional cost increases the overall social costs.
Is a tax on golden parachutes superior to other forms of
regulation? One form of regulation is to impose a ban on granting
any compensation above a certain threshold in connection with a
change in control.167 The difference between a ban and a corrective
tax is that under a tax, the firms can choose whether they prefer to
pay the additional tax and grant the golden parachute.168 A general ban on golden parachutes might be problematic because it
prevents beneficial uses of golden parachutes. As mentioned above,
it is unclear whether granting golden parachutes despite the tax
penalty reduces the agency costs or aggravates them, thereby further decreasing the shareholder value.
Another possible regulation is to empower shareholders
and increase their monitoring on golden parachute contracts. The
2010 Dodd-Frank Act mandated advisory shareholder votes on all
future adoptions of golden parachutes by public firms.169 Corporate laws can adopt a stricter policy, such as requiring shareholder approval for golden parachutes, and not only an advisory
vote. It is possible that empowered shareholders would be able to
limit the use of a golden parachute when it is against their interest,
and allow it when it is beneficial for them. However, the shareholders might face similar ambiguities when deciding whether
golden parachutes serve their interest or not; this is because their
overall effect on executive incentives is uncertain.170
Another policy alternative is to impose a performance-based
corrective taxation on the golden parachute payments. The tax
See generally Walker, supra note 4, for a discussion whether managers
are able to shift taxes to the firms.
167 See, e.g., Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110343, § 111(b)(2)(C), 122 Stat. 3765 (imposing a ban on golden parachute payments by bailed-out financial institutions to executives during the period in
which the Treasury holds an equity or debt position).
168 For a general discussion on the differences between a tax and a ban, see
supra text accompanying notes 22 and 23.
169 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. 111203, § 951, 124. Stat. 1376, 1899, 1900 (2010).
170 See Bebchuk et al., supra note 130, for a discussion of the various effects.
166
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will be imposed after a certain period has passed since the change
in control, when it is possible to assess whether the sale has increased value to shareholders, filtering out negative and positive
effects caused by market trends and other windfalls. The assessment of the excess return, the benefit resulting from the change
in control, can be done by economists in an independent agency
separated from the IRS to isolate it from pressures to raise more
revenues. A more sophisticated form of a performance-based corrective tax would tie the size of the golden parachute, the benefit
or cost to the corporation from the change in control, and the tax
rate.171 As suggested by Walker in his proposal mentioned below,
it is possible to grant the investors a tax relief equal to the tax
paid by the executives.172 Alternatively, the golden parachute itself could be designed this way, in an agreement that resembles
a clawback provision.173
To conclude, it is questionable whether taxing golden parachutes results in better incentives for managers and in a higher
firm value, especially in poorly governed firms. Other forms of
regulation, such as strengthening external and internal monitoring on changes in control, might be superior to corrective taxation.
C. Breaking Pyramidal Business Structures
1. The Rationales for Breaking Pyramidal Business
Structures
The main corporate governance concern regarding pyramidal business structures is the separation between ownership and
control, which is also described in the literature as a separation
For example, assume that the change in control resulted in an excess
return of $10 million to the shareholders. This valuation is made two years
after the change in control, so that its negative and positive effects are better
known. If the golden parachute was of $5 million, it should go untaxed. If it
was of $15 million, it should be taxed at a rate of at least 33 percent. If the
change of control did not result in any excess return to the shareholders, it is
possible to tax the golden parachute at a rate of 100 percent. If the change of
control resulted in excess losses to the shareholders, it is possible even to fine
the executives for approving it.
172 See Walker, supra note 4, at 346, 368–70.
173 For a discussion on clawbacks, see Jesse Fried & Nitzan Shilon, Excess-Pay Clawbacks, 36 J. CORP. L. 721, 723 (2011).
171
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between cash flow rights and voting rights.174 Control achieved
through a pyramidal structure could be beneficial for the controller where the private benefits of control are large.175
Separation of ownership and control might have serious
corporate governance ramifications. One major threat is managerial entrenchment: managers that do not maximize the value of
the corporation and cannot be voted out by shareholders because
they control the top of the pyramid of the business group. 176 An
entrenched controller with most of the cash flow rights would not
be disciplined by the market for corporate control, but would still be
incentivized to increase the firm’s value because he or she holds
a large stake of the cash flow rights.177 However, where both market discipline and financial incentives are absent, like in business
pyramids with multiple layers and a large gap between voting
rights and cash flow rights, entrenchment might result in having
managers not promoting the interest of the other stakeholders.178
Another major concern is that pyramidal structures provide the controller with greater tunneling opportunities. Tunneling
can take place where assets are transferred for less than their
actual value from a firm in which the controller’s share of ownership is low to a firm in which the controller’s share of ownership
is high.179 The controller may be able to take opportunities of the
business group and exploit them in a manner that benefits him or
her at the expense of other shareholders.180 In addition, complexity
in pyramidal business structures can be used to disguise diversion
and accounting manipulations that would be more transparent in a
flatter and less complex structure.181 Tunneling can also take
See Lucian A. Bebchuk, Corporate Pyramids in the Israeli Economy: Problems
and Policies—A Report Prepared for the Committee on Increasing Competitiveness in the Economy, at 5 (Mar. 2012), http://www.financeisrael.mof.gov.il/finance
israel/Docs/En/publications/opinion_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FEN7-GWBA]. For
example, a controller that owns 50 percent of a firm that owns 50 percent of
another firm achieves control of the latter firm, whereas it owns only 25 percent of its equity. If the latter firm owns 50 percent of another firm, the cash
flow rights of the controller in that firm would be 12.5 percent.
175 See Bebchuk, supra note 174, at 7–8.
176 See Morck, supra note 1, at 160–62.
177 See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 49.
178 See id.
179 See Bebchuk, supra note 174, at 8ï9.
180 See id.
181 See id.
174

250 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221
place through the employment of family members and friends as
executives and directors in the various firms in the pyramid.182
A pyramidal structure might also create suboptimal incentives for business decisions regarding expanding and contracting.
Controllers of pyramidal business groups might have incentives
to expand more than is desirable, as well as stronger incentives
to avoid contracting.183 These incentives arise because the controller can extract private benefits from capital that is inside the
business group, while bearing only a fraction of the costs associated with raising this capital.184
The greater the gap between the cash flow rights and the
voting rights held by the controller, the more serious the distortions are, as incentives for tunneling and underperformance due
to entrenchment increase.185 Several studies have documented
these phenomena in various countries, including India,186 South
Korea,187 China,188 Hong Kong,189 Taiwan,190 and Italy.191 There is
a significant body of empirical literature which shows that pyramidal business structures are associated with a lower value for outside shareholders, and that this reduction in value is higher when
the gap between cash flow rights and voting rights increases.192
See id.
See id. at 10.
184 See id.
185 See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
186 See Marianne Bertrand et al., Ferreting Out Tunneling: An Application
to Indian Business Groups, 117 QUART. J. ECON. 121 (2002).
187 See Kee-Hong Bae et al., Tunneling or Value Added? Evidence from Mergers
by Korean Business Groups, 57 J. FIN. 2695, 2695–96 (2002); Jae-Seung Baek
et al., Business Groups and Tunneling: Evidence from Private Securities Offerings by Korean Chaebols, 61 J. FIN. 2415, 2415–16 (2006).
188 See Guohua Jiang et al., Tunneling Through Intercorporate Loans: The
China Experience, 98 J. FIN. ECON. 1 (2010).
189 See Yan-Leung Cheung et al., Tunneling, Propping, and Expropriation:
Evidence from Connected Party Transactions in Hong Kong, 82 J. FIN. ECON.
343, 343–44 (2006).
190 See Yin-Hua Yeh & Tracie Woidtke, Commitment or Entrenchment?:
Controlling Shareholders and Board Composition, 29 J. BANKING & FIN. 1857,
1857–58 (2005).
191 See Paolo Volpin, Governance with Poor Investor Protection: Evidence from
Top Executive Turnover in Italy, 64 J. FIN. ECON. 61, 61–62 (2002).
192 See Bebchuk, supra note 174, at 19–20.
182
183
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Some arguments in support of pyramidal structures are
relevant mostly to developing countries. In a developing country,
large business groups can substitute for weak external institutions by raising capital, contracting, and developing human capital
within the pyramidal business group. 193 These advantages are
likely very small in developed countries.194 Other considerations
supporting eliminating pyramidal business structures include
concerns regarding competition and political power of these groups,
as well as the tax-avoidance opportunities that these structures
might enable.195 Private ordering without regulatory intervention
might not mitigate some of the negative effects of pyramidal business groups, as shown in evidence documenting this phenomenon
in various countries.196 This could be explained by the business
groups’ concentrated market power, strong political power, and
access to funding from financial institutions.197

See id. at 16ï17.
See id.
195 Large business groups might gain market power that could endanger
competition. See Morck, supra note 1, at 163–64. Some countries are concerned
with the increased market power of large business groups. For example, a few
years ago Israel adopted a law which limits business groups’ pyramidal structures because of concerns regarding concentrated market power and limited
competition. See The Law for Promotion of Competition and Reduction of Concentration, 5774-2013 (2013) (Isr.), http://www.knesset.gov.il/Laws/Data/law
/2420/2420.pdf [https://perma.cc/XGT3-WWU5], translated in http://www.anti
trust.gov.il/eng/subject/215.aspx [https://perma.cc/7JDW-MUJG]. The Roosevelt administration was concerned about the strong political power of a wealthy
business elite that controlled the business groups. Pyramidal corporate groups
allow wealthy individuals and families to control assets worth much more than
their actual wealth. In addition, once business groups are established, they are
hard to dismantle because of the political power their controllers exert. Other
political economy considerations, such as increased incentives for business
groups to intervene in politics through lobbying instead of investing in enhancing productivity, may also support the dismantling of pyramidal business
groups. See Morck, supra note 1, at 164–66. In addition, it is possible that a
complex domestic structure provides a greater ability to shift income between
affiliated entities and to avoid taxation. Tax planning opportunities may exist
where different affiliates have different profits and are subject to different tax
regimes. See id. at 162–63.
196 See Bebchuk, supra note 174, at 11ï12.
197 See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
193
194
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2. Intercorporate Dividend Taxation
One unique tax rule in the United States is the taxation of
intercorporate dividends.198 In general, if a corporation receives a
dividend from another corporation, the dividend is taxed at the
rate of 10.5 percent.199 If the corporation receiving the dividend
owns between 20 percent and 80 percent of the distributing corporation’s stock, the dividend is taxed at the rate of 7 percent.200
If the corporation receiving the dividend owns more than 80 percent of the distributing corporation, the dividend is not taxed.201
This non-taxation applies only if the corporation paying the dividend is liable for tax in the United States.202 No other major economy in the world imposes comparable taxation on dividends paid by
subsidiaries to parent companies.203 In fact, the European Union
forbids its members from imposing such taxes.204 For most countries in the world, pyramidal business groups dominate large corporate sectors.205
According to Morck, the intercorporate dividend tax in the
United States was adopted as a part of a deliberate and successful
strategy in the 1930s, which aimed to break pyramidal business
groups; these were believed to cause corporate governance problems,
tax avoidance, antitrust issues, and highly concentrated political
influence.206 The Roosevelt administration convinced Congress to
take major steps against business groups, including enacting intercorporate dividend taxes, abolishing consolidated tax filing for
business groups, eliminating capital gains taxes on liquidated
controlled subsidiaries, and banning pyramidal business groups
from controlling public utility companies.207 It is worth noting the
future of the intercorporate dividend tax is uncertain, and it might
§ 243.
See id.
200 See Morck, supra note 1, at 145.
201 See id.
202 §§ 243ï45.
203 See Morck, supra note 1, at 146ï47.
204 See id. at 135.
205 See id. at 135–37.
206 See id.
207 See id. at 149. Some commentators argue that pyramidal business structures were already becoming uncommon in the United States for other reasons.
See Steven A. Bank & Brian Cheffins, The Corporate Pyramid Fable, 84 BUS.
HIST. REV. 435, 436 (2010).
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be eliminated in the future.208 The Bush administration tried eliminating the tax without success in early drafts of the Jobs and
Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act, enacted in 2003.209
3. Using Taxation to Break Pyramidal Business Structures
As discussed above, many empirical studies show the negative implications of pyramidal business structures in developed
economies, while the positive benefits are very limited. Although
the negative effects are well documented, it is hard to gauge the
average cost caused by using pyramidal levels.210 Therefore, the
case for banning or limiting pyramidal structures by using a ban
appears more compelling than the use of corrective taxation.
It is important to distinguish between corrective taxation that
aims to internalize negative externalities, and tax penalties that
are used to ensure compliance with a particular rule regardless of
the externalities involved.211 A sufficiently high tax penalty can be
used to enforce a de facto ban or obligation. For example, the 30 percent withholding tax imposed on certain payments to non-participating foreign financial institutions under the Foreign Accounting
Tax Compliance Act was adopted as a tax penalty to achieve the
full cooperation of foreign financial institutions.212 One consideration that might support using tax penalties rather than a ban is
the political ability to legislate these penalties. Another consideration is institutional: which agency should enforce this rule? The
IRS is likely to enforce the tax penalty, whereas the SEC is more
likely to enforce a ban imposed on publicly traded firms.213
See Morck, supra note 1, at 137, 167–68.
See id.
210 It is hard to assess the social costs from any additional layer in a corporate
structure and the costs of different pyramidal structures may vary significantly. For a general discussion on situations where the negative externality from
a certain activity varies significantly across the different agents, see Fleischer,
supra note 14, at 1694.
211 See generally Anthony Ogus, Corrective Taxes and Financial Impositions
as Regulatory Instruments, 61 MOD. L. REV. 767, 771 (1998) (distinguishing between taxes are used to deter a certain conduct and taxes that are used to internalize externalities).
212 §§ 1471–1474.
213 For a general discussion on the tax system and institutional design considerations, see David A. Weisbach & Jacob Nussim, The Integration of Tax
and Spending Programs, 113 YALE L.J. 955 (2004).
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It is possible that the intercorporate taxation in the United
States is a tax penalty that operates as a de facto ban, although
it still allows pyramidal structures where the benefits are large
enough. A few years ago, Israel adopted a ban on a pyramidal structure with more than two levels.214 A controlled firm can control no
more than one other firm.215 If the lower firm controls another firm,
a court will appoint a trustee to sell the remaining firm.216 The
Israeli legislature considered and rejected following the American
model of taxing the intercorporate dividends.217 It is unclear
which model is superior, though it seems that either a ban or a
tax penalty that is high enough can achieve similar results.
A corrective tax on pyramidal structures should be set on
the negative externality resulting from that structure.218 The inefficiencies associated with pyramids increase where the gap between voting rights and cash flow rights are larger.219 Therefore,
corrective tax should increase in a similar manner. The current
tax rules in the United States impose a higher tax on holdings
lower than 20 percent, a lower tax on holdings between 20 and 80
percent, and no tax where the holdings exceed 80 percent.220 This
may serve as a very rough approximation of the negative externalities that increase where the controller’s share is lower. One
advantage of having these three categories is the simplicity of this
rule. However, imposing a similar tax where the holding is 21 percent and where it is 79 percent cannot be justified on corrective
grounds, as the externalities should be very different. In addition,
imposing a higher tax on intercorporate dividends where there is no
effective control—where the holding is lower than 20 percent—
would be hard to explain as a corrective measure.
If the negative externality decreases with ownership, the tax
on intercorporate dividends can track this relationship by adjusting
the tax to the ownership rights. We should find the level of ownership
which enables an effective control—for example, 30 percent—and
the level of ownership which is high enough to provide sufficient
incentives to the owner—for example, 80 percent. If the negative
See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
See id.
216 See id.
217 See id.
218 See supra text accompanying notes 73–74.
219 See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
220 See supra text accompanying notes 198–200.
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effects decrease linearly, the tax should follow this by decreasing
from a high tax rate, where the ownership is 30 percent, to a zero
tax rate, where the ownership is 80 percent.
One advantage of optimal corrective taxation over a ban or
a tax penalty—that serves as a de facto ban—is that the former
does not prevent efficient pyramids, where there is a value-maximizing reason to have a pyramidal structure.221 However, assessing the accurate negative externalities associated with different
pyramidal structures would be very hard.222 A corrective tax
which is too low would result in a social cost from having many
inefficient pyramids, whereas a corrective tax which is too high
would be a de facto ban. In addition, it may be more politically
feasible to adopt a tax, including a tax penalty that is a de facto
ban, rather than an outright ban.223
An alternative to a tax or a ban is regulation that imposes
stricter standards on pyramidal business groups, or empowers the
noncontrolling shareholders. In theory, these regulations could reduce the private benefits of control and other inefficiencies. However,
the effectiveness of these measures might be limited due to information and collective action problems.224
To conclude, the abundance of evidence on the inefficiencies caused by pyramidal structures, and the dearth of evidence
supporting positive benefits from pyramids, support adopting a
ban or a tax penalty that operates as a de facto ban rather than a
corrective tax.
D. Reducing Excessive Executive Compensation
1. Executive Compensation
According to Jensen and Meckling, a board of directors that
cannot fully observe the effort and effectiveness of the firm’s executives would negotiate a contract in order to minimize agency
For a general discussion on the differences between a tax and a ban, see
supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
222 See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
223 This depends on the specific political situation and the relevant taxes
and bans under consideration.
224 These problems may explain why pyramidal structures are very prevalent in many countries, as discussed in supra Section II.C.1.
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costs and maximize shareholder value.225 An alternative theory
contends that the outside directors who decide on executive compensation lack proper incentives to set executive compensation
that maximizes shareholder value, and that the executives’ influence over the board undermines the directors’ independence and
ability to serve the firm’s best interest.226 In addition, if a substantial number of firms pay excessive executive compensation,
other firms will also increase their compensation level through
benchmarking, and the overall level of compensation will go up.227
While the average executive pay of large listed companies
increased substantially since the 1980s,228 some analysts argue
that this does not necessarily mean current prevalent executive
compensation levels are excessive. Kaplan found the ratio of largecompany CEO pay compared to firm market value is roughly similar to its level in the late 1970s, and lower than its levels before
the 1960s.229 CEO pay levels relative to other highly paid groups
today are comparable to their average levels in the early 1990s.230
These patterns may suggest that similar forces, such as technology and scale, have played a meaningful role in driving executive
compensation, as well as the pay of others with top incomes.231
Kaplan contends that although pay levels are very high relative
to the typical household, a meaningful part of CEO pay appears
to be driven by the market for talent.232
Excessive executive compensation might still exist where
there are corporate governance failures and pay outliers. Excessive compensation, which is a form of tunneling, is inefficient because it imposes an additional cost on investment in the corporate
sector, resulting in the distortion of capital allocation.233 Walker
contends that economic cost created by excessive compensation
See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. FIN. ECON. 305,
321 (1976).
226 See Walker, supra note 4, at 332–34.
227 See id.
228 See id. at 330.
229 See Kaplan, supra note 96, at 147.
230 See id.
231 See id.
232 See id. at 103.
233 See Walker, supra note 4, at 336–41.
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reduces the investors’ return from investment in the corporate
sector, in a manner that is analogous to corporate income tax.234
If the incidence of corporate taxation is at least partially similar
to the incidence of excessive executive compensation, it is likely
that a significant portion of this cost is shifted in the long run
from shareholders to immobile production factors, such as labor.235
In the short run, unexpected increases in executive compensation
might be borne by existing shareholders.236 However, predicted levels of excessive pay would reduce the return on domestic stocks,
and some capital that would have been invested in stocks would
flow to other investment opportunities.237 Excessive executive compensation may also be objectionable because of its distributive consequences.238 Excessive compensation may have been a contributing
factor to the increase in the inequality of wealth distribution in the
United States in the last recent decades.239
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Excessive Executive
Compensation
Taxation can be used to mitigate a market failure with respect to excessive executive compensation in publicly traded firms.
Walker suggests imposing a surtax on executive compensation in
excess of a certain threshold, combined with granting shareholders a tax relief equal to the tax paid by their executives.240 Walker
predicts that this surtax would create only minor distortions, as
the evidence on the elasticity of executive labor supply and taxable income indicates that a modest increase of the tax on executive compensation would have little influence on hours worked.241
If, however, managers were able to shift this tax onto the firm by
increasing the pre-tax compensation level, it could undermine the
See id.
See id at 341.
236 See id.
237 See id. at 335–42.
238 See supra text accompanying note 76.
239 See Walker, supra note 4, at 342–44. For a discussion on excessive executive
pay as a factor in income inequality, see generally Daniel J. Morrissey, Executive Compensation and Income Inequality, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 1 (2013).
240 See Walker, supra note 4, at 346.
241 See id. at 353–58.
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purpose of this proposal.242 Although the experience with the
“golden parachute” tax suggests a portion of the surtax might be
shifted from managers to investors, Walker believes the ability to
shift this tax would be limited, and the surtax could be increased
as a response to an increase in the pre-tax compensation level.243
He also contends that there is no high likelihood this surtax would
cause a significant number of private firms to avoid becoming
public, or that public firms would go private.244
Walker suggests adopting a combined approach of imposing a surtax combined with providing a tax relief, mainly because
of the risk that some of the surtax would be shifted to investors.245
If excessive executive compensation is inefficient because it imposes
an additional cost on investment in the corporate sector, and if
the surtax could be partially shifted onto investors, then this surtax might exacerbate the distortion and further suppress investment in the corporate sector.246 Providing tax relief equal to the
surtax would mitigate this distortion.247 The tax relief could be
firm-specific or general, and can be structured in a few ways.248
Although firm-specific tax relief would mitigate the distortion created by the tax, firms might be more willing to increase the compensation if they receive a firm-specific tax relief equal to the tax.249
This proposal has the potential to reduce executive compensation. However, similar to the discussion above regarding section 162(m) and golden parachutes, executives in poorly governed
firms are more likely to shift the tax burden onto their firms, in
whole or in part.250 Consequently, the effectiveness of this tool might
be limited, especially with respect to poorly governed firms. It is
unclear whether reducing compensation levels of executives in
well-governed firms is desirable. As noted by Walker, it is possible
that the compensation packages of executives in such firms are
excessive as a result of benchmarking and upward ratcheting.251
See id.
See id.
244 See id.
245 See id. at 368–70.
246 See id.
247 See id.
248 See id, at 370–73.
249 See id.; Doran, supra note 97, at 140–41.
250 See Walker, supra note 4, at 328.
251 See id. at 335.
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However, if the prevalent current pay levels are not excessive in
these firms, as suggested by Kaplan, corrective taxation might
distort the market for corporate managers.252 Therefore, there is
a risk that using corrective taxation to reduce the level of executive compensation might be ineffective for poorly governed firms,
and distortive for well-governed firms.
If the optimal levels of compensation vary across firms and
industries, the use of corrective taxation which is calculated based
on the average negative externality would likely be suboptimal.253
As noted by Walker, it is possible to customize the corrective tax
based on factors such as firm size and risk. 254 However, it is unclear whether the government has enough information to be able
to define groups of companies that should have similar levels of compensation, define the optimal level of compensation, and determine
what would be the optimal corrective taxation for each group.
Defining the thresholds of excessive compensation in legislation might create other distortions, such as the ratcheting-up
effect caused by the $1 million amount in section 162(m).255 This
is the reason why Walker suggests adopting relatively low thresholds.256 However, if the prevalent current pay levels are not excessive, as suggested by Kaplan, low thresholds might distort the
market for corporate managers.257
Similar to the discussion above regarding performancebased compensation, it is possible that other forms of regulation,
such as empowering shareholders and strengthening board’s independence, would be more effective than taxation in addressing
the problem of executive compensation.258
E. Reducing Tunneling Through Related-Party Transactions
1. Related-Party Transactions
Related-party transactions typically involve a deal between a
firm and its controller, or one of its executives, or a transaction
See Kaplan, supra note 96, at 152ï53.
See generally Fleischer, supra note 14, at 1694.
254 See Walker, supra note 4, at 347
255 See id. at 361–62.
256 See id. at 362.
257 See Kaplan, supra note 96, at 152–53.
258 See infra Section II.G.
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between affiliated entities.259 The main concern in related-party
transactions is that the deal might be used for tunneling, serving
the interest of an insider, usually the executive or the controller, at
the expense of the corporation and the outside shareholders.260 This
is usually done through pricing that does not follow the arm’s length
principle, where insiders sell overpriced assets or services to the
firm, or buy assets or services from the firm for a price below their
fair value.261 The concern is greater where the party who benefits
from the transaction has fewer cash flow rights in the firm.262
Related-party transactions could be beneficial to the corporation in some cases, despite the risk that they might enable tunneling. Their value might be low where a similar transaction can be
done with an unrelated party. However, there are cases in which
a related-party transaction could not be easily substituted with a
transaction with unrelated parties. It might be the case where the
transaction involves unique assets or if there are asymmetric information problems that reduce the attractiveness of offers from
external parties. It is also possible that some related-party transactions would produce rents from synergy where related parties
collaborate. Nonetheless, in these cases where there are no market
benchmarks for similar arm’s length transactions, it is harder to
determine whether the transaction is beneficial to the corporation.
Related-party transactions are usually regulated but not
banned.263 They are subject to disclosure requirements and special audit standards.264 For example, Delaware Corporate Law sets
requirements for an approval of a transaction between a corporation and its directors, officers, or parties related to them.265 It requires that the transaction should be fair to the corporation, that
there be a full disclosure of the interest to the board and shareholders, and also an approval by the shareholders and the disinterested directors.266
See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 11.
See id. at 5ï6.
261 See id. at 6–9.
262 See supra text accompanying notes 48 and 49.
263 See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (2017) (detailing how Delaware regulates related-party transactions).
264 See AS 2410: Related Parties, PUBL. COMPANY ACCT. OVERSIGHT BOARD,
https://www.pcaobus.org/Standards/Auditing/Pages/AS2410.aspx [https://perma
.cc/B72D-Y39U] (reviewing the related-party transactions rule).
265 DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144.
266 See id.
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2. Using Taxation to Reduce Tunneling Through RelatedParty Transactions
What would be the effect of imposing a surtax on relatedparty transactions? Assume that a surtax is imposed on the insider
dealing with the firm or on the firm itself. The surtax could be
calculated as a percentage of the value transferred or as a percentage of the profit from the transaction. Where tunneling is
done through an overpriced sale of an asset from the insider to the
firm, a surtax on the sale profit or the gross receipt may eliminate
the insider’s benefit, unless he or she can shift the tax burden onto
the firm. Where tunneling takes place through an underpriced
sale of an asset from the firm to an insider, a tax calculated as a
percentage of the purchase could be used to eliminate the benefit.
Where there is no comparable arm’s length transaction, it
is hard to determine which party is gaining or losing. Such a surtax would likely reduce some bad transactions that are used for
tunneling and some good transactions that are beneficial to the
firm. A surtax that is not too high would allow the very beneficial
related-party transactions to take place, while preventing the
moderately beneficial ones. Likewise, it would prevent the moderately bad transactions, while maintaining managerial incentives to
conduct transactions in which the tunneled value is very high. It
is possible that the very bad transactions would be prevented by
other corporate governance mechanisms, such as the fiduciary duties of care and loyalty. Remaining transactions that get through in
spite of the tax would be subject to more attention, and require a
strong justification, and therefore monitoring might be easier.
It is unclear if the benefit from preventing bad related-party
transactions exceeds the cost from preventing beneficial relatedparty transactions. A tax might be superior to a complete ban on
related-party transactions, as the very good transactions would
take place under a tax, whereas they would be prevented under a
ban.267 However, as the costs and benefits from related-party
transactions vary significantly, depending on the specific transaction, a corrective tax is unlikely to be the optimal regulatory instrument.268 In addition, poorly governed firms might still approve
transactions that trigger the tax, although they do not benefit the
For a general discussion on the differences between a tax and a ban, see
supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
268 See generally Fleischer, supra note 14, at 1694.
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firm, thereby exacerbating the harm to shareholders and the social deadweight loss. Therefore, the case for imposing a surtax on
related-party transactions to reduce tunneling through such transactions appears unconvincing.
Other forms of regulation could possibly lead to approving
good transactions and rejecting bad ones. Corporate law rules, requiring an approval by a majority of the uninterested directors and
shareholders, might serve as a more precise mechanism for that
purpose.269 This mechanism has other limitations that are beyond
the scope of this Article, and it is possible that even under this
mechanism harmful transactions would be approved and some
beneficial transactions would be prevented.270
Tax authorities can interfere where the prices used in related-party transactions do not reflect fair market values under
the arm’s length principle.271 However, tax authorities only have
an interest in such transactions if they result in lower tax revenues.272 In many cases, where the assets move from one taxable
entity to another, tunneling through related-party transactions
does not result in lower tax revenues.273 Even where taxable income is reduced, tax authorities have limited success in effectively enforcing the arm’s length principle.
F. Reducing Agency Costs from Entrenchment
1. Entrenchment
As discussed above, managerial entrenchment occurs where
managers make it impractical or very costly for shareholders to replace them.274 One of the main arguments in the corporate governance literature is that anti-takeover devices are socially inefficient.275
Anti-takeover devices, such as dual class stocks and poison pills,
make it harder for shareholders to remove underperforming managers.276 If managers can counter disciplinary forces and entrench
See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 11.
See id. at 13.
271 § 482.
272 Tax authorities do not have an incentive to dispute overpayment of tax.
273 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 15–16.
274 See Shleifer & Vishny, supra note 44, at 123.
275 See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 745.
276 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 571.
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themselves, this would cause suboptimal managerial incentives
because managers are not exposed to the risk of being replaced
for underperformance.277 In cases where managers hold a large
stake of the firm’s cash flow rights, they will still have incentives
to maximize the value of the firm.278 However, the incentive problem would be greater where managers do not hold equity rights
high enough to align their interests with shareholders and provide
them with incentives to maximize the firm’s value.279
Supporters of the use of anti-takeover arrangements emphasize their importance in preventing harmful takeovers.280 Per
this view, anti-takeover measures serve an important role in preventing negative interventions and pressures from short-term-oriented
activists and harmful hostile takeovers.281
2. Using Taxation to Reduce Agency Costs from Entrenchment
The current tax system does not tax anti-takeover devices.282
Issuing poison pills and dual class stocks is a non-taxable event.283
Staggered board structure is a corporate governance practice that
does not have any tax consequence.284 Nonetheless, as suggested
by Hynes, it is possible to impose a tax on firms or on their managers if they adopt anti-takeover devices.285
This tax would prevent some harmful and some beneficial
uses of these devices, as discussed above. It would also discourage
some firms from going public or from issuing a large amount of stocks
See Bebchuk, supra note 46, at 719ï20.
See supra text accompanying notes 48–49.
279 See id.
280 See, e.g., Martin Lipton & Theodore Mirvis, Harvard’s Shareholders Rights
Project is Wrong, HLS FORUM ON CORP. GOV. & FIN. REG. (Mar. 23, 2012), https://
corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2012/03/23/harvards-shareholder-rights-project-is-wrong/
[https://perma.cc/AD6A-XUD2].
281 See id.
282 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 29 (giving an example of
poison pills as a non-taxable event).
283 See id.
284 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 570 (explaining that staggered board structure is a type of anti-takeover device and therefore not taxed).
285 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 569ï70, 384 (“[T]he government could assess
an additional tax on public corporations based on the anti-takeover provisions
that they adopt.”).
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resulting in increasing the risk of a takeover.286 In addition, it is
possible that firms with worse corporate governance would be more
likely to adopt anti-takeover devices despite the tax penalty.287 It
is unclear what would be the net social gain from this corrective
taxation. Moreover, it is very hard to assess the economic cost associated with the use of these devices.288 As a result, it would be
hard to set a corrective tax equal to the negative externality. A tax
rate too low or too high would result in the suboptimal use of antitakeover devices.289 Therefore, the case for taxing anti-takeover
devices to reduce agency costs from entrenchment appears unconvincing. It is possible that mechanisms that strengthen the outside
shareholders’ ability to periodically approve or veto the use of these
devices would be superior to taxation.
G. Considerations for Using Corrective Taxation
Based on the analysis above, this part identifies the factors
that limit the effectiveness of taxation in mitigating corporate
governance inefficiencies. First, because firms with different corporate governance characteristics vary in their reaction to taxation,290
imposing the same tax on firms with different characteristics
might not prompt the desired response. This may be especially
true for firms with poor corporate governance. The experiences
with many firms in adopting nonperformance-based compensation and large golden parachutes indicate that taxation might not
be an effective means to change practices in poorly governed
firms. Firms with better corporate governance are more likely to
alter their practices in response to a corrective tax, whereas firms
with worse corporate governance might decide to incur the tax
penalty rather than change their practices. If the tax is formally
imposed on managers, managers in poorly governed firms are more
likely to trigger the tax and shift the tax burden onto the firm.
Therefore, unlike negative externalities that can be internalized
through corrective taxation, taxation may not effectively counter
corporate governance agency problems since the same conditions
that gave rise to the agency problem might undermine the effectiveness of the corrective taxes.
See id at 583.
See infra Section II.G.
288 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 582.
289 Cf. supra text accompanying note 222.
290 See, e.g., Desai et al., supra note 24, at 599; infra Part III.
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Second, if the tax burden is shifted onto shareholders, in
whole or in part, it would reduce the taxes’ benefit and the efficiency gain from imposing them. From the shareholders’ standpoint,
a beneficial tax would be one that reduces the costs from corporate
governance inefficiencies to such an extent that exceeds the tax
burden shifted onto the firm. Shareholders might also benefit
when the increase in tax revenue results in a decrease in other
taxes.291 From a broader efficiency perspective, corporate agency
costs reduce investment in the corporate sector and distort the
allocation of capital.292 If the corrective tax is borne by the firm,
it would reduce the social benefit from that corrective tax. Walker’s
proposal, to impose a surtax on excessive executive compensation,
tries to mitigate this problem by granting the investors a tax relief equal to the surtax paid by the executives.293 However, granting such a tax relief increases the likelihood that managers would
shift the tax costs onto firms, especially in poorly governed firms.294
Third, the same corporate governance practices that are
harmful in some situations may be beneficial in others. Imposing
a tax that discourages the harmful uses of a particular practice
would discourage the beneficial uses as well.295 Golden parachutes
encourage managers to find beneficial sales and may overcome
managerial entrenchment, but they can also lead to harmful
changes in control.296 Some related-party transactions may be
used for tunneling, while others can increase firm value.297 Antitakeover arrangements might be used by an underperforming
management to entrench itself, but the same measures could allow a firm with excellent management to oppose harmful bids
that might destroy the firm’s long-term value.298 It would be very
hard to design a corrective tax that targets only the harmful uses
For example, increasing taxation at the corporate level while reducing
the taxation on dividend distribution may benefit the shareholders as further
discussed in infra Section III.B.
292 See Walker, supra note 4, at 336.
293 See id. at 368–70.
294 See id. at 371–73. As noted by Walker, this effect will be smaller if the
tax relief is general and not firm-specific.
295 See generally Fleischer, supra note 14, at 1694.
296 See supra Section II.B.1.
297 See supra Section II.E.1.
298 See supra Section II.F.1.
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of these practices. Usually in cases where a corrective taxation is
considered and imposed, there is a clear negative externality associated with a particular action (e.g., polluting), but that may not
be the case with corporate governance practices. Since some of the
corporate governance practices have mixed effects, using a tax
that would reduce both the harmful and the beneficial uses of
these practices might not be optimal.299
A corrective tax should equal the average externality
where heterogeneity exists. A tax equal to the average externality, calculated by taking into account the offsetting effect of the
positive externality, could result in not internalizing the negative
externality of the harmful uses of these practices.300 At the same
time, it would discourage beneficial uses of these practices.
Strengthening mechanisms that can distinguish between harmful and beneficial applications, and then allowing only the latter
ones, could be superior to taxation.
Fourth, the tax system is limited in its ability to assess real
risk and performance goals. As discussed above, the tax penalty
under section 162(m) could be easily avoided by granting compensation conditioned on easily attainable performance targets. 301
The tax authorities’ limited ability to assess these factors raises
doubts about the effectiveness of using tax rules to incentivize
pay-for-performance.
Fifth, taxation might not have much advantage over other
forms of regulation in reducing corporate governance inefficiencies. Corrective taxation would be preferable where the government
does not know what terms are optimal, but can assess the externalities generated by the relevant behaviors and practices, and
can impose a tax equal to these externalities.302 If the government
knows what the best governance terms are, command and control
regulation would be preferable.303 For example, substantial evidence showing the negative implications of pyramidal business structures might justify a ban.304 With respect to golden parachutes,
related-party transactions, and anti-takeover devices, it is unclear
See supra text accompanying notes 13 and 14.
See id. For a general discussion, see Fleischer, supra note 14, at 1694.
301 See Doran, supra note 97, at 121; Walker, supra note 4, at 384.
302 See Hynes, supra note 19, at 582.
303 See id.
304 See the discussion in supra Section II.C.
299
300
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what terms are optimal, and it is very hard to assess the externalities these practices create.  
  ǡ 
   ǡ the case for using corrective taxes against such corporate governance practices is very
weak, and different forms of regulation may be preferable.
Unlike a ban, taxation results in an action to take place if
the benefit exceeds the cost of the tax.305 Taxation would be advantageous where the benefit for the firm from a particular action
exceeds the tax, whereas a ban would prevent any action regardless of the potential benefit.306 However, if insiders, and not the
firm, receive that benefit while the firm is harmed from the action, the shareholders would prefer a ban.307 In addition, a tax
may be more politically feasible than a ban. Though not within
the scope of this Article, an alternative to taxation and bans is to
strengthen the internal and external mechanisms that distinguish between the harmful and the beneficial applications of corporate governance practices.
III. HOW DO GENERAL TAX RULES AFFECT CORPORATE GOVERNANCE?
General tax rules are not corrective taxes, because they do
not aim to encourage or discourage any particular activity. Nonetheless, they have a significant influence on corporate governance
agency problems. This part explores the effects of general tax
rules on corporate governance, and how these rules can be used
to reduce corporate agency costs.
A. Corporate Income Taxation and Enforcement Efforts
A higher corporate tax rate increases the incentives for
tunneling, whereas higher enforcement efforts can improve monitoring and prevent diversion. Desai et al. analyze how the corporate
tax rate and enforcement efforts affect the level of managerial diversion.308 According to their model, “a higher tax rate increases
For a general discussion on the differences between a tax and a ban, see
supra text accompanying notes 22–23.
306 See id.
307 See id.
308 See Desai et al., supra note 24, at 599.
305
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the return to theft by insiders....”309 Increased tax enforcement
efforts also reduce the incentives for theft by insiders, as the external monitoring by the tax authorities deters insiders from
stealing.310 Thus, an increase in tax enforcement efforts can increase the value which the outside shareholders would receive, as
well as the overall value of the firm.311 Governments can improve
corporate governance outcomes by lowering the corporate income tax
rate, especially where corporate governance is weak,312 as this would
reduce incentives for tunneling by insiders. An increase in tax enforcement efforts can also benefit the government with an increase
in tax revenues, and the outside shareholders with a reduction of
agency costs.313
The positive effect of tax enforcement on corporate governance is supported by several studies. El Ghoul et al.’s study examined the impact of tax enforcement on agency problems in
American publicly traded companies and found that a higher likelihood of an IRS audit lowers the equity financing costs.314 It also
found that IRS oversight is more valuable for firms with weaker
corporate governance.315 These findings suggest that investors
view IRS audits as a monitoring mechanism that mitigates
agency costs, especially for firms with problematic corporate governance.316 Similarly, a study conducted in China found that tax
enforcement efforts reduce agency costs and improve market performance.317 In another study, Hanlon and Slemrod examined the
See id. at 592. The term “theft” in Desai et al. means diversion by insiders
of otherwise taxable income, at the expense of both the outside shareholders
and the state. Id.
310 See id.
311 See id.
312 See id. at 594.
313 See id.
314 See Sadok el Ghoul, Omrane Guedhami & Jeffrey Pittman, The Role of IRS
Monitoring in Equity Pricing in Public Firms, 28 CONT. ACCT. RES. 643, 667 (2011).
315 See id.
316 See id.
317 See Weichu Xu, Yamin Zeng & Junsheng Zhang, Tax Enforcement as a
Corporate Governance Mechanism: Empirical Evidence from China, 19 CORP.
GOVERNANCE: INT’L REV. 25, 27 (2011) (arguing that tunneling is a prevalent
phenomenon in emerging markets like China, and that higher tax enforcement
efforts serve as an external corporate governance mechanism that reduces the
incentives for tunneling).
309
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stock price reaction to news about tax aggressiveness and found
that the stock price usually declines as a reaction to news regarding
the involvement of the firm in tax sheltering, although this market reaction is small in comparison to reactions to other corporate
misdeeds and accounting misrepresentations.318 The decline in
the stock price is smaller for firms which have good corporate governance, and this suggests that investors in these firms are less
concerned that involvement in tax sheltering is associated with
tunneling at the expense of shareholders.319
In some cases, managerial fraud actions, such as earnings
management, result in paying corporate taxes higher than the
amount of tax due if the earnings were reported accurately.320 Erickson et al. found that firms that were accused by the SEC of fraudulently overstating their earnings also overpaid their taxes.321 This
suggests that the threat of IRS monitoring caused these firms to
overpay their taxes.322 If earnings management results in shifting
income between periods, and the overall reported income is similar to the income that should have been reported, then the effect of
excessive tax payments might be insignificant, as the tax payments in the following periods will be lower.323 In addition, tax authorities, usually focusing on increasing tax revenues, do not have
a strong incentive to detect incidences of inflated tax payments.324
It is also possible that inflated tax payments are harder to detect
See Michelle Hanlon & Joel Slemrod, What Does Tax Aggressiveness Signal?
Evidence From Stock Price Reactions to News About Tax Shelter Involvement,
93 J. PUB. ECON. 126, 128 (2009).
319 Hanlon and Slemrod also found that the reaction was stronger in the
retail sector, which may suggest a reputational cost from a consumer backlash.
See id. at 127.
320 See Merle Erickson, Michelle Hanlon & Edward L. Maydew, How Much
Will Firms Pay for Earnings That Do Not Exist? Evidence of Taxes Paid on
Allegedly Fraudulent Earnings, 79 ACCT. REV. 387, 388 (2004) (finding that, in
a sample of firms accused of fraudulently overstating their earnings, “many
firms included the overstated financial accounting income on their tax returns.”); id. at 406 (finding that “managers engage[d] in this tax overpayment
behavior to reduce the chances that outsiders will discover that their financial
accounting earnings are overstated.”).
321 See id. at 389 (“The mean (median) taxes paid per dollar of earnings
overstatement is $.011 ($0.08).”).
322 See id. at 390; Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 21.
323 See Erickson et al., supra note 320, at 391.
324 See id.
318
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than underpayment of taxes.325 Therefore, where poor corporate governance results in a tax payment higher than required, an increase
in the enforcement efforts would likely not resolve this problem.
B. Dividend Taxation
High dividend tax rates appear to have a negative influence on corporate governance and managerial incentives. Chetty
and Saez contend that dividend taxation creates a deadweight loss
because it distorts the tradeoff between dividend distribution and
pet project investment.326 A corporate income tax does not aggravate
the managers’ incentives to invest inefficiently in pet projects.327
Thus, corporate income taxation is more efficient than dividend
taxation because it does not distort the dividend distribution decision as dividend tax does.328 Chetty and Saez’s analysis follows
the results from empirical studies on the 2003 dividend tax reform: regular dividend payouts rose sharply after the 2003 tax cuts,
with a stronger response in firms with many accumulated assets,
firms whose executives own a large number of shares, and firms
with a large shareholder serving on the board of directors.329 Chetty
and Saez explain these findings as being consistent with an agency
problem where a divergence between shareholders and managers
arises in respect of perks and pet projects.330 When managers have
stronger incentives to maximize profits for shareholders—either
because of a higher level of incentive compensation, or because of
a more effective monitoring by large shareholders—an increase in
dividends is more likely in response to a tax reduction.331
Edwards et al. found that the combined effects of dividend
taxation and financial reporting incentives encourage the managers of MNEs that have high levels of cash accumulated overseas
to make less profitable cash acquisitions of foreign companies than
MNEs with lower levels of trapped cash.332
See id.
See Chetty & Saez, supra note 25, at 1–3.
327 See id.
328 See id.
329 See id.
330 See id.
331 See id.
332 See Alexander Edwards, Todd Kravet & Ryan Wilson, Trapped Cash and
the Profitability of Foreign Acquisitions, 33 CONTEMP. ACCT. RES. 44, 45 (2015).
325
326
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Morck and Yeung also analyze the effect of dividend taxation on corporate governance.333 Following Jensen,334 they argue
that well-governed mature firms that generate more income than
is needed to finance profitable investment opportunities should
pay out their residual income, or free cash flow, as dividends.335
However, insiders might use the free cash flow to fund their private benefits.336 Jensen named this phenomenon the free cash
flow agency problem.337 There is evidence which shows that many
firms choose a level of reinvestment which is too high and that
dividend distribution is inefficiently low.338 Moreover, there is evidence that firms with stronger shareholder rights distribute
higher dividends.339 Desai et al. found that parent companies require higher dividend payouts from subsidiaries in countries with
lower corporate governance standards, which may indicate that
dividends are needed to control managers of foreign affiliates.340
Under these explanations, better corporate governance results in
larger dividends.341 Therefore, Morck and Yeung contend that a
high dividend tax rate is detrimental to corporate governance, because it provides managers with a reason to retain earnings rather
than to distribute them as dividends.342
One consideration which supports retaining a certain level
of taxation on dividend distribution to individuals is the incentive
it creates for these individuals to invest through tax-exempt institutional investment entities, such as pension funds, which reduce the collective action problems and improve monitoring.343
Thus, Morck and Yeung support lowering, but not eliminating,
See Morck & Yeung, supra note 26, at 163ï64.
See Michael C. Jensen, Agency Costs of Free Cash Flow, Corporate Finance,
and Takeovers, 76 AM. ECON. REV. 323 (1986).
335 See Morck & Yeung, supra note 26, at 167.
336 See Jensen, supra note 334, at 323.
337 See id. at 329.
338 See Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, A Survey of Corporate Governance, 52 J. FIN. 737, 746 (1997).
339 See Rafael La Porta et al., Agency Problems and Dividend Policies
around the World, 55 J. FIN. 1 (2000).
340 See Mihir A. Desai, C. Fritz Foley & James R. Hines Jr., Dividend Policy
Inside the Multinational Firm, 36 FIN. MGMT. 5, 5ï6 (2007).
341 See Morck & Yeung, supra note 26, at 172.
342 See id. at 172ï73.
343 See id.
333
334
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individual taxation on dividends, while retaining the intercorporate dividend taxes as a means of preventing the resurgence of
the pyramidal business groups.344
To conclude, the literature on corporate income taxation
and on dividend taxation indicates that high corporate income
and dividend tax rates have a negative influence on corporate governance and managerial incentives. Higher enforcement efforts
improve corporate governance by providing a more effective external monitoring, which can benefit outside shareholders of firms
with weak corporate governance.345 Corporate income taxation is
superior to dividend taxation as a revenue source, because it creates fewer distortions.346 Nonetheless, a low level of dividend taxation on distribution to individuals would provide them with a
stronger incentive to invest through tax-exempt institutional investors, such as pension funds, which can mitigate the collective
action problem and improve monitoring.347
C. Individual Income Taxation
Certain individual tax rules in the United States encourage
granting executive compensation in the form of unvested stock options, restricted stocks, and other forms of deferred compensation
granted under future performance conditions.348 Section 83 grants
a deferral of the tax on these forms of compensation until they are
not subject to a “substantial risk of forfeiture.”349 However, certain performance conditions that are easily attainable are considered as creating a “substantial risk of forfeiture” for the purposes
of this tax rule.350 The transferee can elect to be taxed on the
See id. at 178.
See Desai et al., supra note 340, at 5ï6.
346 See Chetty & Saez, supra note 25, at 27.
347 See Morck & Yeung, supra note 26, at 173.
348 The property that can be transferred under this rule includes real and
personal property other than either cash or an unfunded and unsecured promise to pay money or property in the future. The term also includes a beneficial
interest in assets, including cash, which are transferred or set aside from the
claims of creditors of the transferor, for example, in a trust or in an escrow
account. See Treas. Reg. § 1.83-3(e).
349 § 83. One common example of a condition that creates a substantial risk
of forfeiture is a requirement to work for the firm for a certain period of time.
350 See id.
344
345

2017]

CAN TAXES MITIGATE?

273

transfer earlier, but in case the transferred property is forfeited,
the tax paid is not given back.351 The firm can deduct the cost of
granting this property only when it is included in the taxable income of the transferee.352 Where the executive is subject to a
higher marginal tax rate than the firm, it is beneficial for both
the firm and the executive to grant a large portion of the compensation in a tax-deferred manner under this rule.353
The rule in section 83 is substantially different in its purpose from the rule in section 162(m). The rule in section 162(m) is
serving a non-tax purpose: namely, encouraging publicly traded
firms to adopt performance-based compensation for their executives.354 In contrast, the purpose of the rule in section 83 is to
measure income accurately. The rationale in this section is that
an income should be taxed only when it is certain. If there is a
substantial risk that the transferred property might be forfeited,
the income is uncertain and thus should not be taxed.355 However,
firms can adopt easily attainable performance conditions without
a real significant risk of forfeiture, and yet still meet the requirements of this section. Tax authorities have significant difficulties
in observing the actual risk of forfeiture, and thus, they have a
limited ability to monitor whether this rule is used only when
there is a real risk of forfeiture. Consequently, this rule creates
an incentive for firms and executives to grant compensation in the
form of unvested stock options and restricted stocks also when
there is no significant risk of forfeiture.
As discussed above in the context of section 162(m), the effect of increasing equity-based compensation on the quality of corporate governance is questionable. It appears that larger equity
holdings of managers mitigate some of the agency problems because they better align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders.356 However, section 83, similar to section 162(m), fails to
351 § 83(b). This option is attractive where the transferee expects a significant increase in the value of the stock options or the restricted stocks, so that
it is beneficial to pay tax on the current lower value at ordinary tax rates.
352 Id. § 83(h).
353 See Schizer, supra note 9, at 7–8.
354 See supra Section II.A.2.
355 § 83(a)(2).
356 As discussed above, the agency problems are generally more significant
where the managers have less cash flow rights. See supra text accompanying
notes 48 and 49.

274 WILLIAM & MARY BUSINESS LAW REVIEW [Vol. 9:221
incentivize the adoption of performance-based compensation, as
easily achievable performance goals satisfy the requirements for
deferral under this tax rule. Moreover, the outsiders’ enthusiasm
about equity-based compensation might enable managers to receive a higher compensation without reducing their cash compensation: namely, a form of equity tunneling.357 Therefore, it appears
that a tax rule in section 83 that encourages the use of equity-based
compensation may affect the quality of corporate governance, but
its full effect is unclear.
Individual taxation also negatively affects corporate governance through the taxation of working condition fringe benefits.
The tax rule in section 132 for working condition fringe benefits
allows the deduction of some expenses by the firm, without attributing any taxable income to the employees.358 A working condition fringe is defined as “any property or services provided to an
employee of the employer to the extent that, if the employee paid
for such property or services, such payment would be allowable as
a deduction[.]”359 Much of the costs of various managerial perks,
such as expensive offices, can be deducted by the firm, while the
managers are not taxed on the utility they derive from these
perks. Not taxing the benefit for managers, while offering a tax
deduction to the corporation, might increase spending on perks.360
From the shareholders’ standpoint, providing the managers with
tax-favored compensation is beneficial. However, creating a taxinduced incentive to increase spending on perks might harm
shareholders because this form of compensation is not as salient
as other forms of executive compensation, does not require approval and reporting as such, and might not substitute for other
forms of compensation.361
The lower tax rate that applies to long-term capital gains
encourages shareholders to hold shares for at least one year.362
The step-up in basis at the time of death also creates an incentive
See BEBCHUK & FRIED, supra note 78, at 83.
§ 132.
359 Id. § 132(d).
360 For a general discussion on the tax policy consideration concerning the
taxation of fringe benefits, see Yehonatan Givati, Googling a Free Lunch: The
Taxation of Fringe Benefits, 69 TAX L. REV. 275 (2016).
361 See id.
362 § 1222.
357
358
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to hold shares for a long time.363 A shareholder who holds shares
for a longer time might have a stronger incentive to monitor the
management, although it is questionable whether this effect indeed
results in better monitoring.
D. Complexity of the Tax Rules
Tax rules undoubtedly add complexity to corporate structures and transactions. Financial statements do not disclose
much of this complexity.364 It is also very hard to infer information from public financial statements regarding firms’ taxable
income.365 It is possible that this complexity can be used to disguise earnings manipulation and tunneling of value from the firm
to insiders.366 For example, “earnings manipulation was ... central
to Enron’s extensive use of tax shelters.”367 Interestingly, some of
the transactions that Enron made using tax shelters to inflate its
financial income suffered from high transaction costs and fees
while not generating significant tax benefits.368 The tax-driven
complexity of many corporate structures and transactions increases the cost of monitoring of outsiders on actions taken by the
management.369 Transfer of assets between related companies,
which can be explained as tax-driven transactions, can provide
managers and controllers with tunneling opportunities.370 Therefore, simplifying and harmonizing tax rules would likely reduce
corporate agency costs.
Id. § 1014.
Consolidated financial statements report the aggregated assets, liabilities, and performance of the firm and its controlled subsidiaries. In addition,
there is no general reporting obligation with respect to the structure of transactions. The IRS can request information on any transaction, but in most cases
this information remains confidential. Complexity reduces the effectiveness of
the monitoring of the IRS as well, as more resources are needed in order to
understand complicated structures and transactions.
365 See Michelle Hanlon, What Can We Infer about a Firm’s Taxable Income
from Its Financial Statements?, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 831, 831 (2003).
366 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 19–20; Schizer, supra note
9, at 27–28.
367 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 16.
368 See id.
369 See id. at 27.
370 See Atanasov et al., supra note 50, at 39–40.
363
364
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E. Location of Incorporation
Tax incentives may distort the international market for
corporate charters.371 Tax-motivated corporate decisions regarding the location of incorporation can lead to an efficiency cost
where corporations choose jurisdictions that are suboptimal from
a corporate law standpoint.372 Exit taxation may have a deterrent
effect on firms seeking to relocate to a jurisdiction with a preferred regime of corporate law.373 In addition, as long as there is
an overlap between corporate and tax locational rules, there might
be a tradeoff: locations with low tax rates might be preferred even
if they are less desirable on corporate law grounds.374 One proposal suggests severing the market for corporate law from the market for corporate tax law.375 This could be done through the global
coordination of the locational rules for corporate law and corporate
tax law: the “place of incorporation” rule could apply for corporate
law purposes, and a residence test based on other factual factors
could apply for corporate tax purposesɆthe “real seat” rule.376
F. Financing
The tax system influences a firm’s choice between debt and
equity. In general, debt is favored by the tax system because interest
payments are deductible, whereas dividend payments are not deductible.377 A preference to choose debt may affect corporate governance, as debt owed to lenders could replace the equity investments
of the minority shareholders.378 Lenders can monitor the firm’s
governance, although a tax-induced preference for debt might increase the agency problem between lenders and shareholders.379
371 See Mitchell A. Kane & Edward B. Rock, Corporate Taxation and International Charter Competition, 106 MICH. L. REV. 1229, 1231 (2008).
372 See id. at 1230, 1233, 1273.
373 See id. at 1231, 1248.
374 See id. at 1233.
375 See id. at 1257.
376 See id. at 1256–57.
377 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 27.
378 See id.
379 See id.
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Large debt, and the prospect of bankruptcy, can motivate managers
to perform better.380 In the context of mergers and acquisitions,
the tax system treats these mergers differently based on their financing, encouraging the use of equity to finance mergers.381 There
is a need for more research on the corporate governance implications of these effects.
G. Losses and Changes in Control
Section 382 limits an acquirer’s ability to use a target company’s tax losses.382 Therefore, companies with large accumulated
tax losses that they cannot use (“net operating losses” or NOLs)
currently have a strong tax-related reason for objecting to changes in
ownership.383 These limits might exacerbate entrenchment, especially in companies with underperforming management.384
IV. HOW DOES CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AFFECT TAXATION?
Although this Article has focused on the effect of taxation
on corporate governance, it is important to note that corporate
governance practices and characteristics also influence taxation.
Additionally, the effect of corporate governance on taxation is a
relevant factor to consider when evaluating the current tax system and possible reforms.
There is evidence that shows that a higher level of incentive compensation is associated with an increased level of tax
avoidance.385 This connection is possibly stronger among firms
with better corporate governance.386 The ownership structure
also affects the level of tax avoidance. For instance, family-owned
firms and firms with a dual class stock structure have a lower
level of tax avoidance, whereas firms, in which PE firms and hedge
funds have large holdings, show higher levels of tax avoidance, as
discussed below.
See Schizer, supra note 9, at 23.
See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 29.
382 § 382; see Schizer, supra note 9, at 19.
383 See id.
384 See id.
385 See Desai & Dharmapala, supra note 33, at 19.
386 See id. at 20.
380
381
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A. Impact of Incentive Compensation on Tax Avoidance
According to one theory, incentive compensation should
motivate managers to reduce the diversion of rents, and to increase tax avoidance activities that increase the after-tax firm value,
because greater incentive compensation helps to better align managerial incentives with those of shareholders.387 According to a
competing theory, complementarities between diversion and tax
sheltering might offset the increase of after-tax value.388 If a
higher level of tax sheltering might facilitate more managerial
rent extraction, then corporate governance should moderate the
relation between incentive compensation and tax sheltering.389 For
any relationship between diversion and sheltering, firms with better
corporate governance have lower initial diversion levels and, therefore, less scope for potential reduction in diversion.390 Thus, higher
incentive compensation is predicted to result in a higher level of
tax avoidance in firms with better corporate governance.391
One study found that, on average, increases in incentive
compensation to the five highest-paid executives reduce the level
of tax sheltering.392 This result was seen primarily in firms with
weak corporate governance, and it did not hold for firms with
strong corporate governance.393 This evidence suggests that there
are complementarities between sheltering and diversion and that
the relation between incentive compensation and sheltering is
mediated by the strength of the firm’s corporate governance.394
Other studies found a positive association between higher
levels of incentive compensation for executives and corporate tax
avoidance. One study found that larger equity risk incentives for
managers are associated with a higher level of corporate tax aggressiveness; the same study also found that there is little evidence
that the quality of corporate governance moderates the positive
See Mihir A. Desai & Dhammika Dharmapala, Corporate Tax Avoidance
and High-Powered Incentives, 79 J. FIN. ECON. 145, 147 (2006).
388 See id. at 148.
389 See id. at 147–48.
390 See id.
391 See id.
392 See id.
393 See id.
394 See id.
387
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relation between equity risk incentives and risky tax avoidance.395
Another study found that when the executive compensation depends
more on performance, the firm is more likely to get involved in tax
planning, and that other corporate governance measures do not
affect tax avoidance as does incentive compensation.396 Mahenthiran
and Kasipillai analyzed the data of corporations in Malaysia and
found that firms with high performance, and executive compensation tied with performance, are more likely to lower their effective
tax rates through tax planning.397 Hanlon et al. found that pay-forperformance sensitivities for the top five executives are positively
correlated with proposed IRS audit deficiencies.398 Armstrong et
al. found that the executives’ equity incentives and the level of tax
avoidance are positively correlated, and that this correlation is
stronger in the upper end of the tax-avoidance distribution.399
See Sonja Olhoft Rego & Ryan Wilson, Equity Risk Incentives and Corporate
Tax Aggressiveness, 50 J. ACCT. RES. 775, 781 (2012). Rego and Wilson argue
that tax avoidance is a risky activity that imposes costs on both firm and managers. Id. These costs include spending fees paid to accountants and tax attorneys,
time invested in planning for and resolving audits with tax authorities, and
potential costs in case of a dispute with the tax authorities. Therefore, according to Rego and Wilson’s prediction, risk-averse managers prefer undertaking
less risky tax planning, whereas risk-neutral shareholders prefer implementing
all tax strategies that are expected to generate net benefits. Id.
396 See Kristina Minnick & Tracy Noga, Do Corporate Governance Characteristics Influence Tax Management?, 16 J. CORP. FIN. 703, 707 (2010). The
study also found that firms with different governance structures tend to focus
on different tax avoidance strategies: companies with a higher percentage of
independent directors focus more on planning strategies involving foreign
taxes, whereas companies with large boards that are less entrenched tend to
focus on planning strategies involving domestic taxes. Id.
397 See Sakthi Mahenthiran & Jeyapalan Kasipillai, Influence of Ownership
Structure and Corporate Governance on Effective Tax Rates and Tax Planning:
Malaysian Evidence, 27 AUSTL. TAX F. 941, 965 (2012).
398 Michelle Hanlon et al., An Empirical Examination of Corporate Tax Noncompliance, in TAXING CORPORATE INCOME IN THE 21ST CENTURY 171, 172 (Alan
Auerbach et al. eds., 2005). Their study shows that the percentage of bonuses
from the annual compensation and the level of equity incentives from stock
options are positively associated with the proposed deficiencies, indicating that
incentive compensation may be associated with tax aggressiveness. Id.
399 See Christopher S. Armstrong et al., Corporate Governance, Incentives, and
Tax Avoidance, 60 J. ACCT. & ECON. 1, 10, 15 (2015). Using quintile regression,
they found a positive relation between the upper tail of the tax-avoidance distribution and the financial sophistication of the boards’ independence, but a
395
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Overall, although there are mixed results, many of the studies that examine the relationships between corporate governance,
incentive compensation, and tax avoidance found that, on average,
a higher level of incentive compensation is associated with an increased tax-avoidance level.
B. Impact of Ownership Structure on Tax Avoidance
Different ownership structures are associated with different
levels of tax avoidance. One study found that family-owned firms
have a lower level of tax avoidance relative to nonfamily-owned
firms.400 Another study found that firms with dual class stock
ownership engage in less tax avoidance, and that the level of tax
avoidance is declining as the gap between voting rights and cash
flow rights increases.401 These findings are consistent with the
prediction that managers that are insulated from takeovers avoid
the risks associated with taking tax-avoidance measures. The results may also support the view that managers in these firms are
willing to forgo tax advantages to avoid concerns by noncontrolling shareholders, who may fear that tax avoidance is a disguise
for insiders’ rent extraction.
In addition, firms held by private equity and hedge funds show
higher levels of tax avoidance. Badertscher et al. found that PE funds
increase the effectiveness of tax planning for companies in which
they investɆPE-backed firms.402 This effect is stronger for companies in which PE funds hold a majority of the stocks, and where the
negative relation in the lower tail of the tax-avoidance distribution. Id. at 15.
In other words, where the board is more independent and financially sophisticated, very high or very low levels of tax avoidance are less likely to be adopted.
These extremes are likely to decrease the value for shareholders, as one extreme
(very low tax avoidance) might represent an underinvestment in tax avoidance,
and the other extreme (very high tax avoidance) may harm the long-run firm’s
interests due to a high exposure to tax disputes and reputational costs.
400 See Shuping Chen et al., Are Family Firms More Tax Aggressive Than
Non-Family Firms?, 95 J. FIN. ECON. 41, 51 (2010). This effect is stronger for
family-owned firms that expect to raise external capital and family firms with
no long-term institutional investors. Id.
401 See Sean T. McGuire, Dechun Wang & Ryan J. Wilson, Dual Class Ownership and Tax Avoidance, 89 ACCT. REV. 1487, 1488 (2014).
402 See Brad Badertscher et al., The Impact of Private Equity Ownership on
Portfolio Firms’ Corporate Tax Planning 6ï7 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper
No. 10-004, 2010).
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investing PE funds are very large.403 Cheng et al. found that target
firms, after hedge fund intervention, have higher tax-avoidance levels in comparison to matched control firms.404 PE and hedge funds
have strong incentives to engage in costly monitoring activities to
improve the firms’ performance, and they can push for more efficient
tax strategies through their enhanced monitoring.405
These findings should be taken into account when considering reforms which aim to reduce tax-avoidance opportunities.
These results might indicate that eliminating tax-avoidance opportunities would have a stronger effect on firms with higher levels of incentive compensation and firms held by PE and hedge
funds. As mentioned above, it is possible that these are firms with
better corporate governance, executive incentives, and monitoring.
Eliminating tax-avoidance opportunities may encourage these
firms to focus more on the real improvement of their performance
instead of the improvement of their tax efficiency. However, PE
and hedge funds might have lower incentives to invest in and improve on firms with poor corporate governance because the potential return from increasing the tax-avoidance level would be gone.
To the extent that these funds generate positive externalities, a
more efficient and targeted approach would be to grant them a
corrective subsidy.
A tax reform that would eliminate tax-avoidance opportunities, reduce corporate and dividend taxes, and increase enforcement efforts could possibly improve corporate governance for firms
with weak governance. It could also provide well-governed firms
with stronger incentives to focus more on real improvement in
their performance rather than on enhancing their tax efficiency.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
This Article explores how tax policy can improve corporate
governance and reduce corporate agency costs. This Article identifies the reasons for the limited effectiveness of corrective taxes
in mitigating corporate governance inefficiencies. Policymakers
should consider repealing section 162(m) and the tax penalty on
See id. at 3ï4.
See C.S. Agnes Cheng et al., The Effect of Hedge Fund Activism on Corporate Tax Avoidance, 87 ACCT. REV. 1493, 1522 (2012).
405 See id. at 1496ï97.
403
404
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large golden parachutes, and replacing the tax on intercompany
dividends with a ban. Proposals for corrective taxes on high executive compensation, related-party transactions, and anti-takeover
devices should not be adopted because it is unclear whether the
overall benefits from these proposed taxes will exceed their costs.
The effects of general tax rules on corporate governance
should be considered when designing a tax reform. A tax reform
that lowers tax rates on corporate income and dividends, increases
enforcement, and simplifies the tax system, would have a positive
effect on the quality of corporate governance.

